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Building on a philosophical reconstruction of Aristotle, this dissertation argues 
for a non-intellectualist account of virtue education and practical deliberation. 
This dissertation will first examine the notion of habituation. It argues that 
habituation consists in immersing into a certain cultural context, through which 
one will develop one’s unique ethical sense and will know what is noble and 
fine. This rules out two intellectualist positions: that habituation gives us a firm 
understanding of eudaimonia, and that habituation itself involves the exercise 
of the practical intellect. 

The non-intellectualised account of habituation is further supported by a topic-
specific study of Aristotle’s conception of children. In cultivating the seeds of 
virtues that are accessible even to children, one forms evaluative appearances 
about what is and what is not worth-pursuing by generalising from particular 
evaluative experiences. These experiences may come from early private 
education, perceptions, emotions, imitation of others’ attitudes and behaviour, 
and understanding one’s friends’ decisions. These experiences help shape 
one’s ethical sense.

Developing friendship (philia) appears to be ethically important, since we learn 
about values through friendship, and since practical deliberation is more like 
imagining conversations between individuals we are familiar with. This is in 
stark contrast to the intellectualist account of excellent deliberation, which 
consists in deliberating through a comprehensive conception of human values. 
But ultimately, friendship is ethically indispensable because, as a form of 
intimate relationship between agents of equal status, it epitomises an 
Aristotelian ideal: an egalitarian ethical community. Arguably, this community 
constitutes the context for habituation (immersion).

This dissertation shows how opposing positions concerning a variety of 
particular issues become an opposition between two philosophical packages, 
one of intellectualist and one of non-intellectualist, and why the non-
intellectualist one is closer to the truth.
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General Introduction

   What is the nature of virtues? How is it originated - how do we come to 
have virtues? What is the relation between nature and virtues? What role 
does our intellect play in shaping and expressing our character? How does 
the environment or the community we embedded in influence our 
character? How does our character influence our practical deliberation? At 
a very general level, these are the questions that I will be asking in this 
dissertation. 

    More pertinently, I think we can say, the whole project is motivated by 
one question: just how intellectualised virtues are? Does being virtuous 
involve, as some philosophers suggest, grasping the underlying raison 
d'etre of virtue - the ultimate reason why we should be virtuous in the first 
place - basing one’s deliberation on such understanding, and becoming 
virtuous is to set oneself on this path? Or is being virtuous more like having 
the right ends, living in a good community, having virtuous friends, and 
making the right decision here and now? Although this contrast may 
somewhat oversimplifies a lot of issues, in this dissertation I find that there 
are indeed two camps - intellectualised and non-intellectualised - opposing 
to each other, and each of them brings with it a “philosophical package”: a 
whole set of specific positions each responsible for tackling different 
particular issue related to the general contention. I will argue that a rather 
non-intellectualised camp is closer to the truth.

   Throughout this dissertation I will focus on Aristotle’s account of these 
issues. Not only because he is “the” champion of virtue ethics (I know there 
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are many different versions of virtue ethics in contemporary philosophy), but 
also because in my view he had a lot of illuminating and interesting things 
to say on these matter. Further, there is also an opposition between the 
intellectualised and the non-intellectualised interpretation of Aristotle’s 
ethics. Consequently, sorting out and assessing his texts and arguments 
will keep us busy enough. 

   However, in many places I do not simply “reveal” what the “true” Aristotle 
had say. I prefer to think of it as some kind of “philosophical reconstruction” 
of the text. I will quote and comment on the selected passages, and I will 
pay attention to the overall context of the texts. But in several places, 
should I find more elaboration needed, I will not hesitate to provide my own 
understanding despite that Aristotle had say relatively few on it. That’s why I 
believe “an Aristotelian” account is perhaps a better title for the 
dissertation. I will try my best to point out which parts of the discussions are 
my own, and which parts can be attributed to Aristotle. My only hope is that 
I have done enough to separate the two and that the overall approach is still 
within Aristotle’s basic contention. 

    I now proceed to briefly introducing each chapter. I begin by exploring 
the notion of “habituation”, which, as we know, is the core of Aristotle’s 
virtue ethics. After explaining some basic notions surrounding the notion of 
“habituation” - “ends”, “purpose”, “deliberation”, “noble”, etc., I proceed to 
argue against the single most influential (and rather intellectualised, I might 
add) theory in interpreting Aristotle’s notion of “habituation”, namely, the so-
called critical practice model.

 of 2 4
  Then in chapter 2 I will explore Aristotle’s conception of children. If 
habituation is the starting-point of virtue education, then “children” is the 
subject who undergo this process of education. I believe this is a rather new 
topic in the study of Aristotle’s (or Aristotelian) ethics. I explore the 
philosophical significance of a theory of children (that it tells us something 
about how virtues relate to human nature), and I discuss the ethical 
importance of the nuclear family, which is one area where Aristotle explicitly 
argued against Plato. In general, revealing the ethical significance of the 
study of children helps counter the trend to over-intellectualised virtue 
education. 

  Chapter 3 is devoted to “practical induction”, a method according to 
Aristotle we use to grasp the indemonstrable “starting-point” of syllogistic 
reasoning. I contrast an outright intellectualised theory according to which 
such “starting-point” is our intuition into the essence of virtues and 
eudaimonia, with a non-intellectualised theory according to which the 
“starting-point” is our evaluative appearances as to what is valuable. I 
realise that the stalemate between the two is an extension of the debate in 
Chapter 1 and have no way to resolve the matter.

  The final chapter tries to confront the issue on another front: practical 
reasoning. I argue for a theory of practical deliberation that emphasises on 
the influence of friends, emotions and the ethical community. I argue that 
although we need different intellectual skills to deliberate, deliberation is not 
of ends after all. This is a victory of the non-intellectualised camp over the 
intellectualised one, since according to the latter to deliberate excellently 
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we have to deliberate through a comprehensive conception of human 
values, and it is through this conception that we establish the ends by 
deliberation.

   Much is at stake and this is certainly not the only way to approach the 
issues. You may not be convinced by my arguments, but I hope you do 
understand the philosophical pressure that is pushing me to address the 
different particular questions in the ways I did. And I certainly hope we all 
learn something from (my philosophical reconstruction of) Aristotle. 
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Chapter 1  Habituation 
Introduction  
  Aristotle famously remarked that our character (ethos) is a product of 
constant practice or habituation (ethismos) (e.g. NE 1103a16-17), and 
therefore the study of ethics (ethikos) concerns more about action - really 
being a virtuous person - than the purely theoretical truth (e.g. NE 
1103b27-31). Indeed, habituation is of paramount importance in Aristotle’s 
ethics. For instance, in NE 1103b25-26, it is said that having the right kinds 
of habits “from our very youth …makes a very great difference, or rather all 
the difference” (also 1104b10). But how important is habituation? What role 
does the intellect play in the habituation process? And what is the relation 
between nature and habits? In section 1.1, I will discuss the sense in which 
natural or habituated virtues “preserve the first principle”. I will explain how 
our character influences our evaluation of ends and our process of 
reasoning. I will also discuss Aristotle’s famous remark that those who 
attend ethical lectures must have a proper upbringing. In section 1.2, I 
proceed to give an account of the nature of habituation. I will argue against 
the influential account according to which habituation is “critical practice”. I 
propose instead that habituation is immersion into a cultural context. I end 
by noting a potential worry: how far should we acknowledge the relevancy 
of innate predispositions in discussing virtue education? But it will have to 
wait until the next chapter to sketch an answer.
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1.1 The importance of habituation 
   We might as well begin with an account of the importance of habituation, 
or more precisely, the effects it has in the course of moral education. 
Consider the follow passage (for later reference, let’s call it The Key 
Passage):

(a) For excellence and vice respectively preserve and destroy the 
first principle (arche), and in actions that for the sake of which is the 
first principle, as the hypotheses are in mathematics; (b) neither in 
that case is it reason that teaches the first principles, nor is it so here
—excellence either natural or produced by habituation is what 
teaches right opinion about the first principle.  (1151a15-19; 1
1144a29-36; 1113a25–b2; 1104b32–4)

   Here, natural or habituated virtues are said to preserve or “teach right 
opinion about” the arche, which is also the purpose (“that for the sake of 
which”) of action. In Aristotle, “starting-points (archai)" is a protean notion, 
so let’s ponder on this for a while. 

   In ethics, eudaimonia (happiness, flourishing) “is a first principle; for it is 
for the sake of this that we all do everything else” (NE 1102a1-4). As such, it 
is the highest good humans can attain, and it is the source of desirability of 
other less perfect human goods (NE 1098a16-18; Meta. 1021b12-17). But 
what does it mean to say virtues preserve the right opinions about this 
highest good? 

 I am using the The Revised Oxford Translation, unless otherwise indicated. 1
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1.1.1 The epistemic reading  
   It cannot mean that those who have good upbringing (habituated virtues) 
will thereby have an indubitable understanding about the foundation of a 
system of ends such that they can rely on this foundation to make their 
particular choices and perform particular actions. This reading might be 
encouraged by the following passage:

Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is 
noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science 
must have been brought up in good habits. For “the that” are the 
starting-point, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he will not 
need “the because” as well; and the man who has been well brought 
up has or can easily get starting-points. (1095b3-8).

  One might have thought that since those who are well brought up already 
have or can easily get “the that”, which are the starting-point, and therefore 
don’t need “the because” (roughly, the explanation why of “the that”), they 
must already have a firm grasp of what is most foundational. And since 
eudaimonia is the most foundational, they must already possess the right 
conception of eudaimonia. Consequently, proper habituation has the great 
effect of securing one’s understanding of the foundation of values. 

  But this cannot be true. For one thing, it would make the entire Book I of 
the Nicomachean ethics superfluous. For this book is devoted to 
investigating the nature of eudaimonia. As Aristotle remarked, while 
everyone agrees that eudaimonia is the highest good achievable by action, 
“with regard to what eudaimonia is they differ” (NE1095a14-1095a30). One 
has to steer one’s way amid the different common conceptions of 
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eudaimonia, say, amid those that identify eudaimonia with pleasure, those 
with wealth, or those with honour (NE I. 5). For having our conception of this 
highest good clarified we will “be more likely to hit upon what we should”, 
just as archers can better hit the target when they know what to aim at 
(1094a23; EE 1214b7-11). 

  But, then, maybe only those who do not have the prerequisite proper 
upbringing need such clarification? But this makes it hard to even guess 
who would Aristotle’s intended audiences be. For on the one hand, those 
who have proper upbringing do not need the theory of eudaimonia, and on 
the other, there are those who “have not even a conception of what is noble 
and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it” (NE 1179b22-26). These 
do not care about the theory of eudaimonia. But then what’s the point of 
remarking that those who attend ethical lectures must be well brought up? 
But these worries aside, I think there is a deeper problem related to this 
interpretation (that those who are well brought up will have a firm grasp of 
the nature of eudaimonia) . 

   The problem is that it does not fit quite well with Aristotle’s methodology. 
As is often remarked, Aristotle seeks to establish the correctness of a 
certain position by confirming it with common opinions and/or the most 
authoritative ones, “for with a true view all the facts harmonize, but with a 
false one they soon clash” (1098b9-11). We must “first go through the 
puzzles,…for if the difficulties are solved and the reputable opinions remain, 
adequate proof has been given.” (NE 1145b2–7; Top. I.1-2) The inquiry into 
the first principle of ethics is no exception. It is only through this 
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“aporematic” (puzzles-concerning) process that one can gain sufficient 
understanding of the subject-matter in question. More pertinently, we must 
also know “the cause of error—for this contributes towards producing 
conviction, since when a reasonable explanation is given of why the false 
view appears true, this tends to produce belief in the true view” (NE 
1154a22-25). To gain firm understanding of eudaimonia, then, one must 
also explain why, say, hedonism (or the view that identifies eudaimonia with 
pleasure), though false, might appear true from some perspective. But this 
aporematic process requires open-minded and even sympathetic 
investigation of the opponents’ views, highly intellectual skills to examine 
the merits and defects of those views, and good judgment to draw the right 
conclusion from these investigations. Now these, it seems, cannot be 
gained merely through a proper upbringing. So, the effect of habituation 
cannot be that of securing one’s understanding of eudaimonia, the 
foundation of values. That, it seems, is done through philosophy. 

1.1.2 Virtues and purpose 
  However, I think this approach is right about one thing, namely, that 
habituation secures the agent’s relation with the first principle, and thus 
puts him, somehow, on the right track. What I have done until now is to 
argue against the epistemic reading of this point. I now propose my own 
suggestion: habituated virtues preserve the starting-point (of choices and 
actions) in the sense that they provide one the morally secure - that is, 
incorruptible to a certain extent - supposition about the right purpose of 
one’s choices and actions. 
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   Sentence (a) in The Key Passage links first principle with the purpose (that 
for the sake of which) of actions. This suggests that “purpose” here must 
refer to something ultimate or fundamental, as first principle is fundamental. 
Further, Aristotle often remarked that sylllogizing or demonstration must 
always begin from something indemonstrable, which then serves as the 
starting-point of the syllogism (NE 1094a18-21, VI.6; Meta. I. 1, APo. ii. 19). 
This explains the contrast between virtues and reason in sentence (b) of 
The Key Passage. So, the purpose is fundamental in a further sense that it 
is indemonstrable. Habituation, accordingly, is supposed to instil in us the 
indemonstrable fundamental purpose of actions and choices. 

   I will say more about the indemonstrable character of the starting-point in 
ch.3. For now, let’s ask: what is the purpose that is fundamental in the 
relevant sense? The most plausible candidate, I think, is those value 
commitments that define one’s moral character. In the case of the fully 
virtuous agent, this refers to “the fine (kalon)”; the fully virtuous agent aims 
at the fine throughout all his choices and actions. So proper habituation 
enables the agent to have the right value commitments (i.e. aiming at the 
fine), which is the indemonstrable starting-point of his choices and actions.

 There is an intimate connection between practices or activities - 
habituation being a kind of practice - and one’s notion of the right purpose 
of particular choices and actions. This should not be surprising. For 
instance, Aristotle once remarked that “the many and most vulgar seem not 
unreasonably to suppose on the basis of their lives that the good, that is, 
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eudaimonia, is pleasure (NE 1095b14–19, emphasis added ). Here, living a 2
certain life - a life of pleasure - naturally leads one to have the 
corresponding conception of eudaimonia. Moreover, in the process of 
arguing that we are responsible for our character, Aristotle explicitly 
connects leading a certain kind of life and the effects such life has on one’s 
character: “Still they are themselves by their slack lives responsible for 
becoming men of that kind, and men are themselves responsible for being 
unjust or self-indulgent, in that they cheat or spend their time in drinking 
bouts and the like” (NE 1114a3-7). The point is that even if one might not be 
able to exercise one’s willpower to control one’s impulses at a particular 
moment, one is still responsible for leading such a self-indulgent life for it 
puts one in the position of having to fight against one’s impulses . 
3
   Habituation, then, has a cognitive aspect in the sense that, throughout the 
process of internalisation, it enables the subject to come to see the 
reasonableness of the activities he is constantly performing. Those who 
constantly pursue physical pleasure will, as a result of this process, come to 
see pleasure-seeking as reasonable; he is habituated into living a life of 
pleasure. Those who constantly pursue what is noble and fine, will, by 
contrast, come to see noble and fine things as reasonable . 
4
    This should be the place to discuss the difference between this cognitive 
aspect of habituation (which, I think, is very plausible on its own) and the 
 This point is acutely noted in Moss (2014, 226). 2
 Sherman (1997, 77-8).3
 I will say more about how this process takes place in section 3.3.4
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epistemic approach I have rejected above. For one might wonder, certainly 
if proper habituation enables the agent to have the right value commitments 
(i.e. aiming at the fine), and this process has a cognitive aspect, then the 
agent must end up with having a firm, though maybe vague, grasp of the 
first principle, i.e. eudaimonia? Does not this lead us back to the epistemic 
reading of sentence (a) in The Key Passage?

1.1.3 Character shapes deliberation 
  In reply, let me elaborate on the notion of “having the right value 
commitments”. I claimed that this is what proper habituation brings. The 
main theme of my reply is to articulate the effects of habituation at a more 
practical or concrete level. That is, habituation influences first-order 
decision-making, actions, feelings, etc., rather than gives us a unique 
vantage point to conduct a topic-specific study of eudaimonia .
5
   We can think of the significance of one’s character in terms of the roles it 
plays in any given episode of practical deliberation. In Chapter 4, I will 
discuss in details whether deliberation is of ends and whether one needs to 
have a theory of eudaimonia in order to deliberate excellently. For now, 
given the purpose of illustrating the effects of habituation, it suffices to 
highlight two roles character can play in practical deliberation. 

  First, character, once maturely formed, shapes or structures our 
deliberation in the sense that it provides reliable, active and up-to-date 
evaluation and reevaluation of one’s choices and actions given one’s 
 There is a general contrast between Aristotle’s and Socrates’ approaches to ethics. 5
For Aristotle, ethical inquiry aims at becoming good, rather than having theoretical 
knowledge (NE 1103b27-31); but for Socrates, as he said in the Protagoras, one has 
to know what virtue is before one can be truly virtuous. 
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ongoing perception of the salient features (and their changes) of the current 
situation . All sorts of practical factors can figure in this process: the means 6
available, the costs involved, the short-term and/or long-term 
consequences, the pragmatic or symbolic implications of the actions, 
others’ rights, emotional ties, etc. In NE II-V, when Aristotle gave detailed 
analyses of different specific virtues, it is quite clear that different virtues are 
partly encapsulated by their characteristic attention to different salient 
features of the situation. Let’s look at the most vivid example. In the 
analyses of the “greatness of soul”, Aristotle showed clearly how the virtue 
is associated with a certain pattern of reasoning (one may even say a 
certain mindset): 

It is a mark of the great-souled man also to ask for nothing or 
scarcely anything, but to give help readily …..He must also be open 
in his hate and in his love (for to conceal one’s feelings is a mark of 
timidity), and must care more for truth than for what people will 
think, and must speak and act openly; for he is free of speech 
because he is contemptuous……Nor is he given to admiration; for 
nothing to him is great. Nor is he mindful of wrongs; for it is not the 
part of a great-souled man to have a long memory, especially for 
wrongs, but rather to overlook them. Nor is he a gossip; for he will 
speak neither about himself nor about another, since he cares not to 
be praised nor for others to be blamed…..He is one who will 
possess beautiful and profitless things rather than profitable and 
useful ones; for this is more proper to a character that suffices to 
itself (NE 1124b7-1125a12).

 Broadie (1991, 245)6
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  Now, Aristotle had a very neat way to capture this “deliberation-shaping” 
feature of character traits: he drew a distinction between action (praxis) and 
production (poiesis) (and correspondingly between virtue and craft): 

What is true of crafts is not true of virtues. For the products of a craft 
determine by their own qualities whether they have been produced 
well; and so it suffices that they have the right qualities when they 
have been produced. But for actions in accord with the virtues to 
have done temperately or justly it does not suffice that they 
themselves have the right qualities.  (NE 1105a26-b5)
7
The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in 
the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose 
the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action 
must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. (b6-9)

  Those who fulfilled all three conditions are said to be not just doing the 
virtuous acts (just acts, temperate acts, etc.), but doing them as the 
virtuous agent would do it (do just acts justly, etc.). Let’s focus on the 
second condition first. “Choose the actions for their own sake” is said to be 
one of the conditions that distinguishes virtues from craft. What does it 
mean? This has generated a considerable amount of commentary, but the 
basic idea is not difficult to explain. The intuitive idea seems to be that in 
assessing one’s virtue, unlike assessing the product of one’s craft, one has 
to focus not just on the external behaviour (as the product of one’s decision 
or at any rate activation of one’s states), but also the way how one arrives at 
or ends up doing such action, i.e. the reasoning that leads one to such 
 These three sentences are the translation found in Irwin (1999, 22), for it brings out 7
the point in a sharper way.
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action or the character states that dispose one to it.  This, clearly, captures 8
the idea that virtues have a very specific “profile” (and different virtues have 
different profiles): they are associated with a certain pattern of reasoning or 
mindset.    

   It is natural to call the mindset characteristically associated with virtues 
the cognitive-cum-perceptual aspect of virtues. This is a first step towards 
explaining how habituation can be cognitive without being straightforwardly 
epistemic (in the sense of giving the agent the vantage point to grasp 
eudaimonia): instilling in the agent these various virtuous states may make 
him more fully aware of the different mindset characteristic of different 
virtues, it does not automatically give him some kind of understanding 
about the first principle (eudaimonia).

  So the claim is that the “deliberation-shaping” feature of virtues partly 
explains the notion of “having the right value commitments”. Value 
commitments are expressed in one’s process of reasoning, and are 
expressed in a way that makes one closer to (in the case of virtues) or 
farther from (in the case of vices) hitting the intermediate. In this connection, 
let’s look at the third condition of acting virtuously stated in 1105b6-9: the 
action "must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character”. One must 
be able to hit the mark in a reliable way, as opposed to only accidentally, 
and this is guaranteed by having the firm and unchangeable dispositions. In 
other words, the second and the third condition are interrelated: the former 
 Annas (2011, 74) notes that judging a product in isolation from the way it is produced 8
is true only of “production skills” such as house-building, but not so for “performance 
skills” such as dancing and sporting. She concludes that the latter class of skills gives 
a more illuminating analogy. 
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captures the “deliberation-shaping” feature of character, the latter captures 
the psychological stability of this very feature. Surely, the value 
commitments that define one’s character must be stable and 
psychologically fundamental in this way. To relate all these to the topic of 
habituation now, we can make the following short summary: a proper 
upbringing (acquisition of good habits) instils in one the firm and 
unchangeable virtuous dispositions (viz. the virtuous states or fundamental 
value commitments) that will eventually shape or structure one’s 
deliberation. 

1.1.4 Character informs the evaluation of specific ends 
   What about the first condition, that in order to act virtuously one must 
have knowledge? This leads us to the second role character plays in any 
given episode of practical deliberation. This will also be a further elaboration 
of the cognitive aspect of habituation. Character informs one’s evaluative 
supposition of one’s specific or narrow ends in such a way that the actions 
one chooses to perform can be regarded as an expression of one’s 
conception of goodness, or equivalently, one’s idea of what is the best thing 
to do in the particular circumstances. 

  According to this reading, then, the knowledge condition of acting 
virtuously must refer to having the right evaluative supposition of one’s 
specific ends . It is only with the right (virtuous) conception of goodness 9
that one can act virtuously. While this may sound like a tautology, there are 
 I concede that this is a fairly ambitious reading not everyone would automatically 9
accept. Minimally, the knowledge condition merely says the agent must know what he 
is doing in the sense that he is doing the action under the description when that 
description itself is a description of a virtuous action. I will explain more in section 3.3, 
3.4, and section 4.2, 4.3. 
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some interesting remarks related to this idea. First, acting virtuously is not 
simply a matter of promoting the best consequences. For one can promote 
such consequences without intending to do so, that is, without counting 
them as instantiating one’s conception of goodness, or without even 
knowing that one has promoted such results. In other words, in order to act 
virtuously one must act from one’s conception of goodness. So “acting 
virtuously” should really be characterised as “acting on one’s judgment of 
what is the most virtuous thing to do in this particular situation” (and, to 
repeat, the deliberation that leads to such evaluation is also shaped by 
one’s character). 

   Let me elaborate. This gives us some of the recourses we need to have a 
taxonomy of the type of ethical agents. For it is precisely through this 
knowledge condition that the virtuous agent is distinguished from the 
vicious ones. To be vicious is to act on false evaluation of one’s specific 
ends: to be intemperate, for instance, is to have the false evaluation that 
says excessive consumption of alcohol is the most desirable thing to do in 
the particular situation, to be cowardly is to have the false evaluation that 
says it is better to live shamefully than to sacrifice honourably in the 
particular situation. 

   The most problematic case concerns incontinence. On the one hand it is 
neither vice nor virtue per se, yet on the other hand it is connected to both 
of them. It approximates virtues insofar as the incontinent man is closer to 
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being virtuous than the vicious man, for in some sense  he knows he is 10
acting wrongly, (which presupposes that he knows, like the virtuous, what is 
right) yet it also resembles vices for the incontinent and the vicious exhibit 
the same external behaviour. 

  Completing the taxonomy of the ethical types allows us to understand 
better the nature of each type, and therefore the nature of the virtuous. 
Witnessing the problematic nature of incontinence, one might have thought 
the virtuous man is the one who has both the right evaluation (so to 
separate him from the vicious) and the right actions (so to separate him 
from the incontinent). But while this may as well be necessary, it is not 
sufficient to characterise the virtuous agent. This brings us to the last 
ethical type in the taxonomy. For the continent man also has right judgment 
and right action, but he is not thereby virtuous. The most common way to 
capture the difference between continence and being virtuous is to say that 
only the latter, not the former, enjoys choosing to do the virtuous acts. 
Sufficient degree of self-control ensures the continent man to do he right 
thing, but he has to fight against contrary impulses in order to do so. Now, 
 In The Key Passage, Aristotle discussed how the incontinent can be “easily 10
persuaded to change his mind”, but the vicious man cannot (1151a14). The 
incontinent man does not pursue excessive bodily pleasures “on conviction”, he just 
lacks self-control; but the self-indulgent man “is convinced because he is the sort of 
man to pursue them” (a11-13). It is in this context that the natural or habituated virtues 
are said to preserve the first principle. However, the incontinent man is clearly not 
virtuous. So no matter in what ways he shares the same knowledge with the virtuous 
concerning what is valuable (so as to explain how he knows he is acting against his 
own judgment), it is not a case of having the virtues to preserve the first principles (of 
his deliberation and action). So it is not exactly clear how to account for the nature of 
incontinence. The standard account is to say while both the virtuous and the 
incontinent grasp the major premise of the practical syllogism, the incontinent failed to 
grasp the second/minor premise: his perceptions are led astray by some immediate 
temptation. But this does not help much since the major premise can also be 
construed as the “first principles” (see ch.3). 
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Aristotle has a way to analyse the difference: the continent man fulfilled his 
rational desire (or “wish”; boulesis) or desire that is based on his better 
judgment, but his non-rational desire (appetites) are not perfectly in tune 
with his rational choices. The incontinent man has the opposite problem: his 
appetites are satisfied but not his rational desires. Accordingly, the virtuous 
agent should be characterised as the one who has the right rational desire 
(grounded on right judgement) and right (well-educated) appetites. This 
combination brings him to choose virtuous acts willingly and 
wholeheartedly . 
11
   According to this picture, then, it is not just the motivational efficacy of 
one’s judgment that distinguishes the virtuous man from the incontinent 
one. Rather, it is about whether one’s appetites are in tune with the right 
object. In the case of the virtuous man, the appetites desire what one 
judges one should desire. But we have seen what the virtuous agent aims 
at: the fine and the noble. It follows that in the case of the virtuous agent, 
the appetites desire the fine and the noble. This fits Aristotle’s detailed 
discussion of education program in Pol. VIII: “It is evident, then, that there is 
a sort of education in which parents should train their sons, not as being 
useful or necessary, but because it is liberal or noble” (1338a31-2). This is 
also the reason why Aristotle paid so much attention to music education 
(see this chapter below).12
 Reeve (2013, 160). 11
 I will have something more to say about how habituation shapes our character in ch.12
3.3.2.
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  So it matters whether one aspires to the truly valuable things. This should 
be included in the program of proper education, too. It is this feature of 
proper habituation that separates the Aristotelian virtuous agent from those 
who are merely “good citizens”, i.e. those who follow the laws, have a 
disciplined life and maybe even a respectable career. But all the same this 
good citizen can be vulnerable to all sorts of temptations and emotional 
disorder. This is not a trivial claim, for imagine when one’s non-rational 
desires go rogue. Notably many of the character flaws concern or are 
traceable to the condition of one’s pathe. Greed blinds one’s sense of 
fairness, jealous blinds one’s appreciation of others’ merits, anger motivates 
one’s desire to take revenge, and so on. 

  I want to emphasise how non-intellectualised this view is. Recall, 
according to sentence (b) in The Key Passage, it is virtue rather than reason 
that teaches us about the indemonstrable starting-point. Let me now 
explain how I interpret the indemonstrable character of the starting-point.

   The starting-point for any process of reasoning is indemonstrable insofar 
as it ends the series of regress, this by itself should be familiar to anyone 
who knows the argument from infinite regress. But the unfamiliar point is 
that it is virtues rather than reason that give us the starting-point. What 
does this mean? In a given episode of practical reasoning, one cannot both 
deliberate about whether to adopt a certain end and adopt it as an end that 
effectively guides one’s reasoning and action. For any end to be grasped as 
an end, that is, for that end to be the purpose, the “that-for-the-sake-of-
which”, or that which is expressed in one’s chosen action, one has to stop 
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the series of asking for its further rationale . In other words, if practical 13
reasoning is to lead to concrete actions at all, one’s end is such that it 
cannot be the topic of one’s deliberation about whether to adopt that end or 
not. It follows that whenever one is deliberating about whether to pursue 
certain object or state-of-affairs X, this X cannot be the end or purpose of 
one’s action . 
14
   In other words, the starting-point is that which one can find oneself 
accept as what guides one’s reasoning and action. For it is not surprising to 
say what one accepts as the indemonstrable end that guides one’s 
reasoning and action can reflect one’s character. The virtuous man accepts 
the fine and noble as the end that guides his reasoning and action, the 
vicious man accepts the base and shameful. We can imagine a wide range 
of ethical personalities expressed in similar ways. 

  So in saying that it matters whether one aspires to the truly valuable 
things, I mean it matters what one accepts as the indemonstrable end that 
guides one’s reasoning and actions. This is the way to educate one’s non-
rational part of the soul: to go beyond mere continence, we need the 
appetites to be in tune with what is truly valuable, namely, that which 
expresses the excellence of the rational part of the soul, a.k.a. the fine and 
the noble. 

   To summarise: virtuous character informs one’s evaluative judgment of 
the specific ends to the effect that what one chooses to perform is an 
 Russell (2009, 10) made the same point. 13
 This point will be further elaborated in ch.3.3.1 and 3.3.2, using Jessica Moss’ 14
account of practical induction.
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expression of one’s conception of what is noble and fine. This concludes 




  Let’s recap. Character has two roles in a given episode of practical 
deliberation. It shapes our deliberation, and it informs our evaluative 
judgements about the specific ends. The two roles are clearly interrelated. 
Cases about how untrained emotions can distort our judgment and 
reasoning are only one kind of cases. Maybe the clearest way to articulate 
the interrelation of the two roles is to use the schema of practical syllogism. 
The second role concerns how character fixes the major premise, or the 
premise about one’s ends (1144b31), and the first role concerns how one 
formulates the minor premise, or the premise about one’s means. As we 
have seen, different virtues are associated with different specific ways to 
attend to the salient features of the situation. The conclusion - choice or 
action - follows from the premise insofar as one’s judgment expresses one’s 
conception of goodness. The two roles of character are interrelated insofar 
as to be virtuous requires having a sound (true and valid) practical 
syllogism: one has to have the right ends, the right reasoning (inferences), 
and the right conclusion. 

   I have explained the two roles of character in practical reasoning through 
discussing the three conditions of “acting virtuously (as the virtuous agent 
would act)” as they are articulated in NE 1105b6-9. Together they explain 
the effects of habituation or one’s upbringing. To have a proper upbringing 
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(have good habits), accordingly, is to have in one the firm and 
unchangeable virtuous dispositions (viz. the virtuous states or fundamental 
value commitments) that inform one’s judgement and shape one’s 
deliberation about what is and how to realise the noble and the fine. 

   Let’s return to the argument against the epistemic reading of sentence (a) 
in The Key Passage. According to this reading, good upbringing allows one 
to have a firm grasp of the nature of the ultimate goal, eudaimonia. By 
contrast, I argued that habituation has a cognitive aspect insofar as the 
character that it brings about has cognitive functions. Character, as we 
have seen, brings focus to our perception of the salient features of the 
situation (which then shapes the way we deliberate), and it informs our 
evaluative judgement. But all the same those who have formed their 
respective character do not thereby gain a sufficiently firm grasp of the 
nature of the first principle or eudaimonia. They may not have any 
determinate reflective idea about, say, the relative importance of external 
goods, friendships, leisure, and luck. But these are the topics that one 
needs to discuss and clarify in talking reflectively and philosophically about 
eudaimonia, if only to know whether they are the constituents of 
eudaimonia or not. All that one is in a position to know, according to my 
account, are those issues related to particular virtues (friendliness, courage, 
temperance, etc.) , how they influence first-order concrete actions, maybe 15
 On this I am in agreement with Vasiliou (1996, 784).15
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how to observe and assess others’ characters, what counts as noble, and 
so on.

  But then what about passage 1095b3-8, which is cited initially as an 
evidence for the epistemic reading? Recall, according to this passage, the 
man who had proper upbringing has “the that” sufficiently plain to him, and 
therefore “he will not need ‘the because’”. According to the epistemic 
reading, since the passage said “the that” is the first principle, this means 
the first principle or eudaimonia is sufficiently plain to those who had a 
proper upbringing. 

   But I think what Aristotle meant to say here is just that having a proper 
upbringing gives one the “entry ticket” for attending ethical lectures. 
Whether one has a correct understanding of the first principle or not is 
something that has to be assessed independently and after one earned this 
entry ticket. Consistent with the idea that habituation equips the agent with 
some understanding about issues related to the particular virtues, Aristotle 
explained, a few paragraphs before 1095b3-8, that “a young man is not a 
proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the 
actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about 
these (1094b27-32)”. Here, what is required in order to attend the lectures 
of political science is a certain grasp of the materials of the subject-matter. 
For otherwise one cannot even discuss what is taught. 

  The reference to “good judge” in NE 1140a23-30, then, cannot mean 
having good judgments as in being practically wise. Presumably, if one is 
already practically wise (which is itself unlikely to be a product of good 
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habits only), one does not even need the ethical lectures. Rather, it must 
refer to something like “being sensible” or “being commonsensical” with 
respect to ethical issues. Let’s say, then, good habits develop one’s basic 
moral sense. We will say a bit more about this when we discuss music 
education below. 

1.2 The nature of habituation 
  But what is habituation? More specifically, how should it be understood in 
the context of virtue education? In ancient Greek philosophy this question is 
further specified as whether virtues arise from nature, habits or teaching 
(didaxis). In the Meno , for example, Socrates once argued that virtues 16
cannot be taught, since we cannot identify the teachers, i.e. the “moral 
experts”. Correlatively, in NE X. 9 Aristotle pointed out that some people are 
insensitive to nobility and goodness, in which case, therefore, arguments 
are by themselves particularly inept in rehabilitating their characters. Virtues 
do not arise from teachings, then, not because of a failure to find someone 
to fulfil the role of teaching, but because of a failure on the part of those 
who are supposed to learn.

1.2.1 Habituation as critical practice 
   In this section, I will argue against what seems to be the single most 
influential theory when it comes to interpreting Aristotle’s notion of 
habituation: the theory of “critical practice”.

  Aristotle started to discuss the nature of habituation in NE II. 1. In 
1103a26-b27, Aristotle began the discussion of how practices can lead to 
 See also Republic Book II and III (e.g. 401c7–d3, 402a1–4) and Protagoras. 16
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the formation of states by introducing examples concerning skills-
acquisition. Notably, the examples suggested are various kinds of activities, 
singled out one by one: lyre-playing, acts of justice, house-building, etc. It 
is said that “states arise out of like activities”: by being habituated to do or 
feel something - to have a certain response - we are thereby acquainted 
with the sorts of mentality in question. The analogy with skills-acquisition is 
supposed to render more intelligible and persuasive this suggestion. For 
insofar as skills-acquisition is concerned, as the saying goes, “practice 
makes perfect”. 

  As is often pointed out, the process of practice need not be blind or 
mechanical; as Nancy Sherman puts it, habituation concerns “critical 
practices” or “critical activities”. Let me just focus on two hallmarks of this 
theory.  Firstly, the process is not sheer repetition of the same set of 17
responses, but is a series of “successive trials”  trying to approximate an 18
ideal action-type. Secondly, it is only through the continual and 
indispensable contributions from the intellect that we can improve ourselves 
through constant practice. For example, the intellect is responsible for 
specifying the ideal action-type and identifying mistakes. With an 
acceptably clear view of the determinate goal in question, and with the 
industrious efforts to correct one error each time, we can thereby adapt 
 Sherman (1989, 176-183). Cooper (1975, 8), Irwin (1975, 571). suggested also this 17
view. 
 Sherman (1989, 179). 18
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ourselves to the model and use such model to measure our own progress . 19
As Sorabji puts it:

Habituation involves assessing the situation and seeing what is 
called for……the learner must get into the habit of avoiding anger, or 
feeling it, in accordance with his intuitive perception of what the 
occasion demands (emphasise mine).

    This picture of “critical practice” is surely right and illuminating if we have 
in mind the cases of improving and refining our character. We might have a 
general good will towards others, but it would be of no use if we failed to 
know what the virtue of friendliness amounts to. For example, the intellect is 
required to tell that we have to be more observant in noticing others’ needs. 
We might even be guilty of moral complacency if, already failing to fulfil the 
demands of virtues, we also failed to register our own place along the scale 
of improvement. We must learn from past mistakes and put real efforts to 
adjust our mentality accordingly.

    However, it is not clear how useful this model of “critical practice” can be 
in the case of virtues-acquisition, as opposed to virtues-improvement. I 
should mention three doubts. 

   First, virtue education does not seem to begin with critical activities. in 
Pol. 1334b6-1334b28, Aristotle once argued that there should be a certain 
order in education or care: first there is the “care of the body”, then “training 
of the appetites”, and finally the education of reason and understanding. 
Training the appetites comes prior to exercising one’s intellect. In general, 
the model of critical practice presupposes that the agent does have some 
  Sorabji (1980, 216):19
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natural qualities, and the intellect is supposed to refine them. In order to 
acquire the virtue of friendliness, for example, one must already have the 
relevant positive attitudes and trust toward others. These natural qualities, 
these “quasi-virtues”, seem to be part of the concern of virtue education. If 
so, there are some natural qualities that are the precursors of virtues and 
yet are not acquired through the works of the intellect. (I will discuss more 
about this notion of “quasi-virtues” in section 1.3 and I will officially 
introduce a technical definition of it in the next chapter). The contributions 
of the intellect come later in the development process. Yet 1103b25-26 and 
1104b10 quoted earlier did emphasise the right education in “youth”. The 
model of critical practice, which emphasises so much the works of the 
intellect, then, is at best secondary. Indeed, when Sorabji said that the 
instruction “this is what courage requires of us now” can be the starting-
point of moral education, Hursthouse rightly asked: “but what has mother 
been doing with the boy hitherto - just letting him run wild?”. 
20
   Second, there is a series of problems related to emotions. Emotions are 
notoriously recalcitrant to the instructions coming from the intellect. As is 
pointed out by Olfert (2017), the virtuous and the less-than-virtuous agent 
may find different objects pleasurable. For instance, Aristotle once 
remarked that “we are ourselves naturally more inclined towards [physical] 
pleasures, which is why we are more easily drawn in the direction of self-
indulgence than of orderliness” (1108b35-1109a19). And children, he also 
said, enjoy physical pleasure, because they “live according to 
 Hursthouse (1988, 213). 20
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appetite” (1119a33-b6). By contrast, the virtuous agent takes pleasure in 
the fine and noble things.  But it does not seem that we can simply bring 21
ourselves into enjoying the right objects by identifying the goals 
intellectually and measuring our progress in achieving this goal. Critical 
practices do not seem to have much efficacy in these areas. 

   Further, emotions are elusive to the works of the intellect: over-emphases 
on the self-conscious attempts to improve oneself, which might seem 
appropriate for skills acquisition, can be counter-productive when it comes 
to emotions. It is precisely because I am fixated on the need to control my 
anger that I cannot help keep thinking about the things that trigger my fury 
in the first place, which just makes it even harder to remain calm. Also, our 
intellect can get in the way by asking us to think in an overly abstract and 
disengaged manner.  And yet habituation is supposed to help us with the 22
desiderative parts of our soul: “both to delight in and to be pained by the 
things that we ought” (NE 1104b12). 

   Third, there are some pleasures so complex (in their content) that in the 
early stage of virtue development the agent simply cannot appreciate their 
attractiveness. For instance, a just person may take pleasure in seeing that 
a fair policy is finally taking effect. But this kind of appreciation requires 
some understanding about political structure, the political climate, criteria 
for fairness, maybe even the history of the development of a particular 
socio-political movement. While these complex pleasures maybe enjoyable 
to the mature agent whose intellect is well-developed, they are simply not 
 Olfert (2017, 218).21
 Nussbaum, (1992, 81-2). 22
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available to the child. This illustrates how the critical practice model can be 
regarded as over-intellectualising (early) virtue education . 
23
  Before I proceed, I should briefly explain the relation between the critical 
practice model and the “epistemic reading” of the importance of 
habituation as it is discussed in section 1.1 (esp. 1.1.1). I suspect the critical 
practice model is motivated by some version of the epistemic reading. That 
is, although the critical practice model is at first formulated as a model for 
practicing specific kinds of activities, such that the intellect is only 
specifying an action-type, all the same one might think the ultimate aim that 
the intellect is approaching can be a correct conception of eudaimonia. 
Critically conducted habituation eventually gives one the firm understanding 
of the first principle in ethics. Maybe one can say the intellect contributes to 
the practice of critical activities by “translating” some theoretical 
discoveries about ethical matters into practice. Perhaps one will adjust 
one’s attitudes toward friendship and try to look for virtuous friends after 
one has studied Aristotle’s theory of character-friendship (NE IX.). With 
respect to the tripartite distinction between nature, habits and teaching, the 
enhanced critical practice model now sees a very close relation between 
habits and teaching. 

    I am not sure what to say about this enhanced critical practice model. On 
the face of it, the critical practice model might provide some resources for 
one to answer the objections pertaining to the epistemic reading. One can, 
 Olfert (2017, 219). 23
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for example, reserve a place for aporematic philosophy in the process of 
habituation by arguing that this is what the intellect is supposed to do. 
Critical practice, then, does not just include identifying past and potential 
mistakes, but also confronting theoretical perplexities. 

  But what I want to emphasise at the moment is just that different 
philosophical positions seem to constitute a package. The critical practice 
model is motivated by some version of the epistemic reading. I will say 
more about the alternative package below. And we will come to see more 
clearly how the packages are formed in ch.3. 

1.2.2 Habituation as immersion 
  The doubts related to the critical practice model invite us to consider a 
different picture. Instead of theorising habituation in terms of critical 
practice, we might instead think of it as immersing oneself into certain 
cultural contexts or ways of life. Here is a first step towards such a picture. 

Habituation as a holistic process 
   Considered as critical practice, habituation is arguably activities-specific. 
Naturally, one can try to improve many different character traits at a time, 
but then one will need many different specific kinds of practices and one 
will need to mobilise the corresponding psychological resources. To deal 
with one’s intemperance, one needs to control one’s appetites; but to deal 
with one’s cowardliness, one has to channel one’s temper to fight against 
harm and danger , and so on.
24
 Broadie & Rowe (2002, 26).24
 of 27 147
 By contrast, when it is one’s whole character that is in question, 
habituation is more likely a holistic process. By immersing themselves into 
rich and fine-grained cultural contexts, the students are more exposed to 
and therefore are more familiar with different practical scenarios. 
Habituation enables one to be liberal or civilised (eleutherios). 

  I have in mind the role Aristotle gave to mousike (music) education in 
Politics VIII. Mousike education was one of the major components in the 
traditional Ancient Greek education system, along side with “reading and 
writing, gymnastic exercises” and drawing (1337b23-24; see also Republic 
376e). It involves not just melody and rhythm, but a whole set of mimetic 
arrangements of poetry, dance, drama, and songs. Through performing 
those conventionalised modes (harmoniai), one is thereby encouraged to 
engage in the specific “emulative and empathetic kind of identification”  25
with the character. As different modes are associated with different moods 
and character, one then gains the first-hand experiences of the nuances 
and rich diversities of the emotions and personalities. No surprise that 
mousike is said to have great educational power:

The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere representations is not 
far removed from the same feeling about realities…music has a 
power of forming the character, and should therefore be introduced 
into the education of the young.…. There seems to be in us a sort of 
affinity to musical modes and rhythms.… (Pol. 1340a17-b19) .
26
 Sherman (1989, 182). See also Lord (1982). 25
Burnyeat’s claim that in acquiring virtues the affective and the cognitive are 26
intertwined (his example is “shame”) is true to this minimal extent (1980, 78). 
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  The students of early education, then, are exposed to contexts as 
complex as the plots and the conventionalised modes can be. Through 
performing the students form shared experiences with others, without 
which the common vocabularies required to establish judgments of 
characters are much harder to be found. In this way they develop their 
basic moral sense. The process is akin to how we pick up our native 
tongue: just as immersing into one’s daily linguistic surroundings enables 
one to develop the native tongue, immersing into one’s cultural 
surroundings enables one to develop the native moral sense. It does not 
require critical activities. Presumably, there will be chances to practice a 
series of targeted activities when one tries to emulate the characters, but 
these are only some of the sub-components, rather than the defining 
characteristic, of the whole program of mousike education. Rather, it is 
more about having an ethical life - they will witness, if not fully experience, 
the practical scenarios of love and companionship, hatred and betrayal, 
victory and humiliation, etc. Participating in mousike performance, then, at 
least helps gathering the prerequisite materials (or at any rate setting the 
stage of getting such materials) for later reflection/teaching/induction with 
respect to the nature of the different characters . 
27
   Now, the contrast between the activities-specific notion and the holistic 
notion of habituation has implications on how we should read NE 
1103b7-1103b26, where the skills analogy is introduced to explain virtue 
formation. Olfert once remarked that when claiming “states arise out of like 
 Moss (2014, 234); also Sorabji (1980, 215-7)27
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activities”, Aristotle committed himself to a dilemma. On the one hand, we 
cannot acquire virtues by doing the virtuous acts, because being able to do 
these acts suggests that one is already virtuous, but one, ex hypothesi, is 
not. Yet on the other hand, says Olfert, we cannot acquire virtues by doing 
anything else either, for it is not clear how doing anything short of virtuous 
acts can lead to the formation of virtuous states. For virtuous states are 
states that prompt us to do the virtuous acts, should the opportunity arise. 
We need, then, to identify a notion of activities that is sufficiently different 
from full-blown virtuous actions (virtuous acts as the virtuous agent would 
have done it), but is also sufficiently similar to full-blown virtuous actions 
such that practicing them would give rise to genuine virtuous states. 
According to Olfert, what we need is some common factor between 
genuine virtuous actions and similar actions as done by the non-virtuous 
people, such that “non-virtuous people can perform roughly the same kind 
of action that a virtuous person would do, even if they do not do it in the 
same way.” 
28
   With regard to the first horn of the dilemma, of course, Aristotle had his 
own solution. He distinguished kinds of virtuous acts and virtuous acts as 
they are done by (or: as expressions of) the virtuous agent. The three 
conditions of “acting virtuously”, as I have discussed in section 1.1.3 and 
1.1.4, are supposed to demarcate this distinction, and therefore give an 
answer to the problem. Merely performing the virtuous actions does not 
automatically suggest that one is virtuous, because these actions may not 
 Olfert (2017, 227). 28
 of 30 147
be grounded in those firm and unchanging virtuous dispositions (viz. the 
virtuous states or fundamental value commitments) that inform judgement 
and shape deliberation.

   With regard to the second horn of the dilemma, however, I think Olfert is 
asking a pseudo-question. For one thing, many have pointed out that 
genuine virtues are so robust that even the same virtue can have very 
different expressions in different situations: “there is no external husk of all 
just actions that we can isolate and repeatedly practice” . So to look for a 29
“common factor” that bridges those actions done by the virtuous agent and 
those by the non-virtuous agent seems a non-starter. For another, it seems 
to me that this question arises only because we are obsessed with the 
activities-specific notion of habituation. For if habituation is just immersing 
oneself into a cultural/ethical context, one’s virtues are developed 
holistically, similar to the way one develops one’s native tongue. 

   More pertinently, different expressions of a single virtue may share some 
kind of family resemblance to each other, but there may not be any common 
thread that unites them all. To go a bit further, it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that different expressions of different virtues are related in similar 
ways. Maybe a virtue is a structured compound such that different virtues 
can share similar components in similar situations, but all the same they are 
differentiated from each other because they do not share the same overall 
shape.  This is not at all surprising in Aristotle’s framework. After all, virtues 30
that concern similar areas (such as honour) are differentiated from each 
 Sherman (1989, 178); Broadie (1991, 108).29
 This picture is (very briefly) suggested in Nussbaum (1992, 72).30
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other because one is focused on its large-scale expressions (greatness of 
soul) and one is on its ordinary usages (usually dubbed “proper pride”) (NE 
IV. 3-4). They are similar insofar as they share the same proper concern, but 
they are different insofar as the difference in scale calls for differences in 
attitudes, patterns of reasoning, skills, etc.  The upshot is that it is not 31
clear what we are looking for if, according to Olfert, we should look for 
actions that are simultaneously accessible by the less-than-virtuous agent 
and yet are “sufficiently similar” to full-blown virtuous actions. Of course, 
one can define the idea of "sufficient similarity” to include that kind of family 
resemblances I have suggested above, but then it no longer presents any 
difficulty. We learn to be virtuous gradually: some components are learned 
this time, some other components at another time. 

   We can see what response we can have, according to the holistic notion 
of habituation, with respect to the third doubt against the critical practice 
model. Some pleasures are so complex that they require certain intellectual 
power to entertain them. Initially, the point is that in putting the intellect in 
the centre of the picture, the critical practice model over-intellectualised 
(early) virtue education. But these complex pleasures can well be the 
product of a series of holistic processes. It is certainly possible that after 
immersing oneself into a whole lot of different contexts, one begins to be 
able to appreciate the relevant kind of complex pleasures.

   Finally, mousike education is uniquely placed in moulding the desiderative 
parts of the soul (appetites, temper, etc.): “For young persons will not, if 
 Irwin (1988). 31
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they can help, endure anything which is not sweetened by pleasure, and 
music has a natural sweetness (Pol. 1340b15-17) . It gives intellectual 32
enjoyment and is therefore valuable in itself (1338a9-13). It is, then, a noble 
leisure activity whose educational value depends solely on its intrinsic 
feature rather than its being necessary for something else or useful 
(1338a14-21). As a result, it facilitates the proper purpose of education: to 
be liberal or civilised (eleutherios).  We can, then, sidestep the above-33
mentioned second doubt, namely, emotions are recalcitrant to the 
instructions of the intellect. 

Imitation 
  So we have differentiated the activities-specific notion and the holistic 
notion of habituation. The second step is to recognise a different way to 
bring about the formation of states, one that differs from the intellectualised 
attempts characteristic of critical practices. 

  Exactly how does habituation - mousike education and the like - shape 
one’s character as a whole? Recall Aristotle’s remark: “[Human] learns at 
first by imitation” (Poet. 1448b5-8). Attempting to acquire a state through 
constant critical practice can be represented by the schema “by doing this 
particular action I approximate toward the ideal”. (With past mistakes 
identified the “particular actions” needed to be practiced are arguably 
 But not all kinds of mousike, apparently, since “it is quite possible that certain 32
methods of teaching and learning music do really have a degrading effect”. Rather, 
one has to choose the right melodies, rhythms, and even instruments (Pol. 
1340b33-1341a9). 
 That is, provided he is not learning it with a view to being “professional”: “by 33
professional we mean that which is adopted in contests” (1341b9-19). Such learning 
"will be thought menial and servile” (1337b21). 
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different every time). By contrast, in imitating others one will be mainly 
responding to the first-order events and people one meets in different 
scenarios, without the thoughts that articulate the means-end relation, e.g. 
“it is by doing this (the means) that I understand/learn a little bit more about 
virtue X” .

  Learning through imitation is rather like a form of implicit behavioural 
influences . Behaviours of parents, for example, are imitated and have 34
implicit influences on the children, regardless of whether they are intended 
by the adults as explicit instructions . And similar influences occur, 35
expectedly, within friendship (NE IX.12) and the larger political community 
(NE 1179b31-5; Pol. 7.17). Even in things as mundane or insignificant as 
daily conversations, there are layers and frameworks of evaluative 
expectations. Our ethical lives are full of scenarios of rich cultural settings. 
We are constantly exposed to the “contextual guidance” in the “swim of 
human practices” .
36
  Mousike education is like the fictional counterpart of these cultural 
settings. In immersing himself into certain scenarios and narratives, the 
child will mobilise his power of imagination and will also need basic 
discriminatory cognitions to follow the order of events (cf. Poet. 1448b4-17; 
Ph.184b11-12). It is through these mental states and psychological 
 Imitation can, of course, be one way how critical practice is conducted. Presumably 34
this is the reason why Sherman included mousike education as an example of critical 
practice. But at any rate if my reasoning is correct we still need to distinguish, at least 
insofar as the early stages are concerned, between critical practice and the more 
implicit and pervasive kind of habituation. 
 Lawrence (2011, 251). 35
 Lawrence (2011, 251-252). 36
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resources, not the works of the intellect, that habituation can contribute to 
the formation of one’s character as a whole.

   This allows us to address the first doubts pertaining to the critical practice 
model, namely, that the education of the “quasi-virtues” comes prior to the 
works of the intellect. Well, education of these states does not come prior 
to imitations. In fact, behavioural influences from parents and friends are 
always more pervasive and long-lasting than we can recognise; by the time 
we develop the power of reason, we have already formed part of our 
character through such imitative process .
37
   Now, it is quite clear that the “habituation is immersion” thesis correlates 
somehow with what I have said about the role of character in section 1.1.3 
and 1.1.4. Mousike education (done properly) gives one the eye to 
appreciate truly fine and noble things. Further, mousike education and its 
real-life counterpart gives one the basic moral sense, and it is this sense 
that guarantees one’s seat at the ethical lectures.  It is through immersing 
into certain context that one’s character becomes firm and unchanging, 
which then informs one’s judgment of ends and practical reasoning. Just as 
the epistemic reading and the critical practice model together constitute a 
package, now we have the opposing package of views.

 I am very sympathetic to Jessica Moss’s position defended in Moss (2014). There 37
she argued that the ends we have are fixed by character virtues (which are, in turn, 
fixed by our upbringing or habituation) instead of deliberation. Therefore she is arguing 
against the Anti-Humean interpretation of Aristotle’s view on practical reasoning.   

  However, it is important to see that the current discussion is orthogonal to that issue. 
If habituation itself is shaped by the works of the intellect, then there is no sharp 
distinction to be made, at the early stages of moral education, between intellectual 
and non-intellectual elements. It will be intellectual all the way down. But since the 
question whether habituation is intellectual in this way needs further arguments, it 
cannot be settled by arguing for or against the Humean position about practical 
reasoning. I will discuss Aristotle’s view on practical reasoning in Chapter 4. 
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1.2.3 The dialectic 
   Earlier I claimed that the model of critical practice is surely right insofar as 
improving one’s character, as opposed to the initial acquisition of character, 
is concerned. The reasoning that follows then argues that habituation-
immersion should be a better account of character acquisition. So am I 
saying we need two distinct accounts of habituation, one for the 
improvement of character, one for its acquisition? 

  The appropriate conclusion to draw, I think, is this. Extensionally speaking 
the critical practice model certainly does spot one of the crucial examples 
of character development. But it does not follow from this that it is the best 
account overall. After all, even if we restrict ourselves to cases of character 
improvement, critical practice is only one highly-intellectualised way to do 
it. Equally important - and might be more pervasive - are peer influences, 
emotional equanimity , and others less intellectualised but no less 38
intelligent efforts. If the relevant thought can be captured by the schema 
that articulates means-end relation, the “end” in question would more likely 
be, say, peer recognition, peace of mind, solving a particular practical 
problem and so on, not the more articulated and second-order thought “to 
be a person with virtue X is to be such that…”. Additionally, most people 
might not even begin to think of improving their character (or reflect on their 
character) if not because of a serious twist in their lives, maybe a tragic 
 Reeve (1992, 71) observed that the need to engage in full-blooded practical 38
deliberation is often triggered by, or most urgently felt when we are in, an emotionally 
troubling state. It is because we are, for instance, worried, or puzzled, or intimidated 
that we begin to deliberate about what to do. 
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event, or a sudden shift in their local communities . Crucially, all these less 39
intellectualised attempts to improve ourselves presuppose our basic ethical 
sense. It is the habituation that equips us with this sense, then, that is more 
fundamental. 

  The critical practice model is usually put on the table as an argument 
against the idea that habituation is purely mechanical. Habituation cannot 
simply be a matter of blindly and efficiently internalising external 
instructions . This is surely correct; and this motivation is also shared by 40
the account of habituation I have been arguing for. But if my argument is 
correct the critical practice model is not the only alternative. Habituation is 
not a mindless process, yes, but it is a big jump from there to the 
conclusion that it must involve self-conscious intellectual attempts to 
regulate one’s behaviour. Habituation understood as “immersion” gives us a 
middle-ground position between the two extremes. 

  The argument presented above in favor of the “habituation is immersion” 
thesis depends on the premise, noted as the first doubt against the critical 
practice model, that the conditions of the non-intellectual natural qualities 
or “quasi-virtues” are the starting-point of one’s virtue education. The 
“habituation is thesis” is at its strongest in the case of these natural 
qualities. (I gave the example of a vague sense of trust towards others as 
the quasi-virtues of friendliness. Supposedly, these quasi-virtues are the 
 Moss (2014, 239)39
 Hursthouse (1988, 210) called this a “horse-breaking account”, and attributed this 40
view to Engberg-Pedersen (1983)
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precursors of genuine virtues, and, as I argued, they are the focal point of 
habituation-immersion. The exercise of the intellect comes in later.) The 
second doubt can be partly regarded as the consequence of this line of 
thinking. For emotions are the most recalcitrant if they are not properly 
trained or addressed. In practice, if one has adequately taken care of those 
natural qualities, the emotions may not present too much a difficulty for the 
development of character. Conversely, if one can argue that virtue 
education cannot begin with these non-intellectual “quasi-virtues”, then it 
might be argued that though recalcitrant as these emotions maybe, it is not 
a failure on the part of the intellect to have left these emotions 
unaddressed. So, the question is: are these “quasi-virtues” the proper 
starting-point of virtue education?

   Here is one worry. In the context of moral education, it is in those cases of 
innate tendency that the influences of “nature” are the most obvious and 
undeniable. In NE 1179b19-31 we read that some people “do not by nature 
obey the sense of shame, but only fear”; but some are “gently born”. But 
quasi-virtues are natural tendencies. If they really are the starting-point of 
virtue education, does this mean not everyone has an equal start in terms of 
character development, that some people have a better (or worse) start as a 
matter of innate predispositions? 

    To answer this question I will have to clarify the nature of “quasi-virtues”. 
I will do this in the next chapter (section 2.2.4). But before that, let me 
briefly summarise what we know so far.
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Conclusion  
   I began this chapter by first discussing the importance of habituation, 
where I argue against the idea that proper habituation gives us a firm grasp 
of the correct conception of the first principle in ethics (eudaimonia). I 
discussed the way character influences our evaluation of specific ends and 
practical reasoning. Then I proceed to explore the nature of habituation. I 
argue for the claim that habituation in Aristotle should be understood as a 
process of immersion, rather than a process of critical practices. But I face 
a problem about treating natural qualities as the starting-point of virtue 
education, and we will have to wait shall the solution presents itself. 
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Chapter 2  Aristotle’s conception of children 

Introduction  
  This chapter explores Aristotle’s conception of children. It is, to a 
considerable extent, an extension of the previous chapter. Both focus on 
the early stages of virtue education. One might say the previous chapter 
clarifies the (causal) starting-point of virtue education and this one clarifies 
the subject who is undergoing this process. 

   I will first fix the age and/or the stage of development of “children” (sec.1), 
in the hope that this will let us know who our protagonist is. Then, after a 
few remarks (sec.2-3), I will explain and defend my first working hypothesis: 
part of understanding how virtues or vices are expressive of human nature 
involves understanding how there are manifestations of these character 
states in the stage of childhood (sec.4). This will lead me to the idea that 
children possess quasi-virtues/vices (sec.5-6), which gives me the basis to 
clarify the relation between nature and habits (sec.7) and to defend the view 
that virtues are not “remedial” (sec.8). From section 9 on I will shift to 
discuss Aristotle’s defence of the ethical value of the nuclear family, as it is 
presented in Pol. II.1-4. Through tracing the dialectic between Aristotle and 
Plato, I try to argue that it comes down to a dispute between two kinds of 
virtue, which I dubbed “solidarity” and “loyalty” respectively (sec.11-13). I 
end by explaining their relations to my working hypothesis. 
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2.1 Theorising the “children” 
2.1.1 Who are the “children”? 
   It will be helpful to try to fix, at the very beginning, the age range of 
“children” and/or the stage of development they are supposed to be in. For 
one thing, Aristotle himself had explicitly said something on this topic. For 
another, it will help to characterise our protagonist: in what follows, when 
we make different claims about “children”, the readers can judge for 
themselves if they find such claims to be plausible for agents of such age or 
stage of development. 

   Aristotle implicitly assumed that we can divide different periods of life by 
age and the corresponding development of our faculties. The turning points 
do not have to be exact, of course. The general idea, I think, is that there 
are biological, psychological, maybe even socio-cultural constraints on how 
we should characterise the process of growing up.   

  First of all is the period of infants. It is clear that this period has nothing to 
do with virtues or vices. For the crucial task at this stage concerns physical 
growth (1336a4-23), which “by its nature [has] no share in human 
excellence” (NE 1102b12). Then, there is the period between infants and the 
age of five or seven. This corresponds roughly to our notion of 
kindergartener. This is the period where “no demand should be made upon 
the child for study or labour, lest its growth be impeded” (Pol. 1336a24-5). 
They are supposed to live at home, listen to tales or stories, and have as 
little contact with indecent things (speeches, actions, pictures) as possible 
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(1336a24-1336b23). The examples suggest that this is when one’s 
perceptual capacities are developed. 

   Then it comes to the period “from seven to the age of puberty”, and finally 
from puberty to the age of twenty-one (Pol. 1336b35-6). Puberty roughly 
corresponds to the age of middle or high school students in the modern 
education system, while the age of twenty-one is usually the age to attend 
college. When Aristotle proceeded to discuss the education program where 
students are supposed to learn “reading and writing, gymnastic exercises, 
and music” in Pol. VIII, he did not explicitly relate this to the division of age 
mentioned at the end of Pol. VII. It is safe to assume that the program starts 
from the age of seven, because before that kindergarteners are not 
supposed to study or labour, and also because Aristotle stated that the 
division of the two periods (from seven to puberty and from puberty to 
twenty-one) is a division “with reference to which education has to be 
divided” (1337a4). 

   Consequently, the period from seven to puberty seems to be the stage 
where the child is gradually developing his cognitive abilities. Learning 
reading and writing pretty much guaranteed that. Aristotle also mentioned 
education of the knowledge useful for money-making, managing the 
household, participating in politics, and judging beauty (Pol. VIII. 3) . Given 41
the scope of these subjects, we may well assume that they may belong 
 Aristotle also remarked that, although gymnastic exercises are necessary, for they 41
prepare the child to be “capable of all the actions of a freeman” (including procreation; 
Pol. 1335b3-1335b12), in general, parents “who devote their children to gymnastics 
whi le they neglect their necessary education, in real i ty make them 
mechanics” (1338b34-5).
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entirely to the second period of education (puberty to twenty-one), or some 
time ranging from the late stages of puberty to the age of twenty-one.

   I suggest the most interesting notion of “children” refers to the middle two 
periods, that is, from kindergartener to puberty. For before kindergarten only 
physical health is concerned, and after puberty it is the time to develop 
one’s intellect - which makes one a young adult already, rather than a child. 
In terms of the development of faculties, it concerns with one’s perceptual 
and basic cognitive power. These two are connected. For both of them 
involve discriminatory cognition: telling similarities and differences between 
things, thereby sharpening one’s cognition of the world. For instance, 
Aristotle once mentioned how a child “begins by calling all men father, and 
all women mother, but later on distinguishes each of them (Phy. 
184b13-14)”. As we shall see, this fits fairly well with other analyses of 
children. 

2.1.2 No one is born virtuous or vicious 
   In Aristotle’s ethics, no one is born vicious, or for that matter, virtuous, 
that is, no one is born with vicious or virtuous states (hexeis). This follows 
from the nature of character as “dispositions”, virtues or vices alike, and the 
empirical fact that children are simply not ready to have character so 
construed. For Aristotle defined character as hexeis, which are “firm and 
unchanging dispositions” (NE 1105a34). These are constant and stable 
components of our personality. But the character of children, whatever that 
is, cannot be firm in a similar way. For they are subjected to all sorts of 
external influences; they do not yet have the unchanging hexeis to resist 
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against bad influences. “[W]e always like best whatever comes first. And 
therefore youth should be kept strangers to all that is bad, and especially to 
things which suggest vice or hate” (Pol. 1336b31-33). 

  Children are born with faculties, the things “in virtue of which we are said 
to be capable of feeling these [passions], e.g. of becoming angry or being 
pained or feeling pity” (1105b23-4), but faculties are not states. For a) states 
are our dispositions to respond vis-a-vis the faculties we are naturally 
endowed with: “by states [I mean] the things in virtue of which we stand 
well or badly with reference to the passions” (1105b25); and, b) there are 
questions of whether we are praiseworthy or blameworthy given our 
responses, but no such ethical assessments are in place for our natural 
faculties (1105b31-3). Patterns of behaviours children exhibited should be 
understood as products of these natural faculties rather than products of 
the unchanging states. 

  Further, as the practical intellect is also responsible for discerning the 
mean in the deficient-mean-excess triad, we may also ask how the child, 
lacking mature intellectual power, is inadequate in this respect. Presumably, 
this is one reason why Aristotle claimed that “the term ‘self-indulgence’ is 
one we also apply to the ways children go wrong, for these have a certain 
resemblance to self-indulgence……since children too live according to 
appetite, and the desire for the pleasant is strongest among them. 
(1119a33–1119b6)”. Children are prone to be excessive when it comes to 
pleasure. Now, according to the Doctrine of the Mean, we should not 
polarise evaluative assessments. There isn’t a simple good/evil, civilised/
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primitive, us/them categorisation. Rather, either side can be found 
problematic if went too far, and either side can be unworthy of any honorific 
title if it failed to live up to the standard.  Aristotle articulated the delicacy 42
of the triadic spectrum by remarking how the vicious may accuse the 
virtuous person of deficiency (if his vice consists in being excessive) or 
excess (if his vice consists in being deficient). For instance, the coward may 
regard the truly courageous person as being rash, while the rash person 
may call the courageous person a coward (1108b17-27) . But arguably this 43
delicacy is what the immature mind failed to comprehend: individuals are 
regarded either as friend or foe, responses are assessed either as 
absolutely right or absolutely wrong. 

2.1.3 The human form of life 
   But Aristotle did recognise “bad nature” such as “brutish states”. Some 
examples he gave are rather scary: tribes that take “delight in raw meat or 
in human flesh, or in lending their children to one another to feast upon” (NE 
1148b19-24). On the other hand, Aristotle also recognised that "as a result 
of some divine causes” there are some “truly fortunate” individuals 
(1179b32-3), they “become gods through an excess of virtue” (1145a23– 
24). Did Aristotle mean to say some are born vicious, and some virtuous? 

  Maybe, but these are at any rate very rare cases. Further, in discussing 
brutish and divine states, Aristotle was not talking about whether anyone is 
 The point is not that we should be aiming at a grey area between good and evil, 42
etc., but that what is truly good cannot be represented as whatever that is opposing 
evil, for that would confuse the truly good with the moral fanatic. By the same token, 
what is truly evil cannot be represented as whatever that is opposed by good, for that 
would confuse the truly evil with any scope of moral latitude. 
 Nielsen (2017, 18, n.25). Broadie (unpublished manuscript). 43
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born virtuous or vicious. The point is that virtues and vices are human 
excellences and defects, in the sense that they are expressive of human 
nature. “For as a brute has no vice or excellence, so neither has a god; his 
state is higher than excellence, and that of a brute is a different kind of state 
from vice” (NE 1145a24-6). We will face difficult and unnecessary 
interpretive and philosophical questions if we treat the divine and the 
brutish states as innate capacity to be virtuous and vicious. For one thing, 
how is it consistent with Aristotle’s claim that the government should be 
responsible for the education of children (Pol. VII. 16-17 and VIII)? For 
another, it also sounds like cheating for any philosophical analyses of 
children. Why bother with the notion of children and childhood if they are, 
ex hypothesi, perfectly virtuous or vicious? Not even a theory of virtues for 
normal adults (such as NE) can include them.

2.2 The philosophical importance of “children” 
2.2.1 My working hypothesis 
  However, I do think that the explanation as to how the virtues/vices can be 
expressive of human nature partly involves a philosophical theory of 
children. Here is my working hypothesis. I think part of understanding how 
virtues (or vices) are human excellence (deficiency), that is, how they are 
excellence that expresses the nature of such beings who are born under-
developed, involves understanding how there are manifestations of these 
character states in the stage of childhood. That is, we should look for the 
seeds of mature character states in childhood, on the assumption that the 
excellence and deficiency of human come through a process of 
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development (from under-developed to fully-developed). Aristotle did 
sometimes speak in this way: “just as in man we find knowledge, wisdom, 
and sagacity, so in certain animals there exists some other natural capacity 
akin to these……in children may be observed the traces and seeds of what 
will one day be settled habits, though psychologically a child hardly differs 
for the time being from an animal” (HA, 588a25b3; cf. NE 1180a4). 

   Further, one must also note that when Aristotle was making a claim about 
human nature, it is not uncommon for him to appeal to some observation to 
support his claims. These observations often either explicitly mention 
children, or are common and mundane enough to include children. For 
example, in the Metaphysics, after famously claiming that “[a]ll men by 
nature desire to know”, Aristotle proceeded to talk about how we take 
delight in our senses, most notably the sense of sight (980a22-980a27). No 
reference to children here, but one may safely assume that children use 
these senses in the same way adults did; after all, senses, unlike crafts and 
excellences, come to us before any prior training and exercises 
(NE1103a26-1103b2). Further, the delight we take in the sense of sight, 
namely, how it “makes us know and brings to light many differences 
between things” (980a27), is shared by everyone: “to be learning something 
is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest 
of mankind, however small their capacity for it” (Poet. 1448b5-1448b17). 
Another example from the Poetics: “It is clear that the general origin of 
poetry was due to two causes, each of them part of human nature. Imitation 
is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower 
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animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the 
world” (1448b5-8).  So, it is not at all surprising if Aristotle should do the 
same in the case of ethics. We can reasonably expect some manifestations 
of virtues or vices in children.

   My approach, however, is not exactly the same as Aristotle’s. On the one 
hand, I share his general commitment that ethics should be more 
concerned with making people virtuous rather than merely discussing/
teaching “ethical knowledge” (NE 1103b27-31). Indeed, this is the main 
duty of the politikos (NE I.8). So, especially in section 2.3, I will talk a lot 
about the development of virtues in children. Yet on the other hand, my 
focus is different from Aristotle’s. It is quite clear that Aristotle was mainly 
addressing adults, especially those who are responsible for (or at least are 
in a position to) making communal educational arrangements or delivering 
educational policies, whereas I am more focusing on the upbringing of 
children itself.  However, I will still try my best to stay close to Aristotle’s 
text, and I will state explicitly should I offer my own elaboration. 

2.2.2 “Natural virtues” in NE VI.13 
   Let’s focus on the case of virtues first; I will explain the case of vices as I 
proceed. There is an obvious objection. In NE VI.13, Aristotle famously 
distinguished natural and proper virtues (kurios arete). Natural virtues are 
virtues only in a derivative sense: only because of their resemblances to 
mature virtues. “[F]rom the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for 
self-control or brave or have the other moral qualities…both children and 
brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities” (1144b3-6), but they 
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are defective: “without thought these are evidently hurtful” (1144b9). Think 
of the natural moral quality that is sometimes regarded as the analogue of 
genuine justice: righteous indignation (EE 1234a23-32). Righteous 
indignation by itself can also lead to some corresponding vices, e.g. 
someone fanatically demands absolute conformity to just laws. Natural 
virtues - or better, natural qualities - then, are defective in the sense that by 
themselves they can lead to vices. And even if what they have led to are not 
as serious as vices, natural virtues by themselves lead to bad or foolish 
decisions. When taken as such, then, these qualities cannot be the 
manifestation of virtues, for genuine virtues cannot be similarly vice-
conducive or allow bad decisions. If one takes the “seeds” metaphor 
seriously, one should also note that actual seeds, unlike natural virtues, 
cannot grow into something contrary to its own potentials.  If we try to look 44
 Sarah Broadie suggested to me that this may imply the view that “vice is only the 44
failure of full virtues”. The idea seems to be that if we take the “seeds” of virtues as 
inherently aiming at full virtues (thus cannot grow contrary to its own potentials), then 
“vice” is only the failure to reach the mature state of this seed. But this is not 
necessarily the case, for there can be seeds of vice distinct from the seeds of virtues, 
as I shall discuss briefly below. The point is only that if we are looking for the “seeds”, 
we should not look at the “natural virtues” as NE VI.13 described it, for “seeds” cannot 
by themselves lead to something of a different nature (whereas it seems that “natural 
virtues” can lead to vice). 
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for the traces and seeds of proper virtues in the NE, then we end up looking 
at these defective natural qualities. 
45
  However, the immediate context of NE VI.13 suggests that Aristotle was 
not really trying to give a fair portrait of the character of children there. For 
the notion of “natural virtue” is the product of a simple thought experiment. 
For earlier in NE VI.12 we have seen, through distinguishing cleverness and 
practical wisdom, that practical wisdom is dependent on moral virtues. But 
if it is possible to have the practical intellectual kind of excellence without 
moral excellence, i.e. cleverness, then conversely it is also possible (at least 
conceptually) to have some sort of moral excellence without intellectual 
excellence, hence the notion of “natural virtues”. That is, the notion of 
natural virtues is introduced as the parallel case for cleverness. 
Furthermore, note that the thought experiment is testing our evaluative 
intuition about the notions in question. That is, excellence in deliberation 
without moral virtues is not just implausible, but undesirable, and renders 
the intellectual excellence unworthy of the honorific title of “practical 
wisdom”. We then proceed to look for the evaluative analogue of 
 One can use the notion of “natural virtues” in NE VI.13 differently. Instead of treating 45
it as an objection to my working hypothesis, one can think of it as giving a better 
formulation of the hypothesis itself. That is, one can say, yes, there are manifestations 
of virtues in children, and they are the defective natural virtues. However, this misses 
the whole point about my working hypothesis. For the overall aim is to understand 
how full-blown virtues and vices can grow in human despite the fact that human 
beings are born under-developed (with respect to both virtues and vices), and the 
hypothesis says there must be something that aims at full virtues (or full vices) in the 
first place. It is in this sense, i.e. in the sense that there are something inherent in 
human nature that can be brought to full-fledged excellence and deficiency, that 
virtues and vices are human excellence and human deficiency. But if the 
manifestations of virtues in children are defective (as in the case of natural virtues) 
and, by definition, distinguished from proper virtues, then it is hard to see how they 
can be illustrative of the relation between virtues and human nature. Therefore, I think 
it should be treated as an objection. 
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cleverness: virtues without intellectual excellence are stubborn and harmful. 
There is really no surprise that natural virtues are portrayed as defective. In 
NE VI.13 the character of children (and animals) is mentioned as a point of 
contrast, with the aim to illustrate the nature of practical wisdom, not to 
really investigate whether children can have any virtues. 

   What about vices? Aristotle did not mention explicitly “natural vices” but 
the notion of natural virtues naturally invites this thought. Further, the notion 
of mere cleverness implies that excellence in instrumental reasoning and 
having the ends (right or wrong) are two different things. So, apparently, one 
can have the wrong ends and still remain intellectually immature. This would 
be the case if children do have natural vices. For example, if righteous 
indignation is the natural analogue of justice, then maybe insensitivity to 
others’ needs and/or indifference to others’ suffering is the natural analogue 
of injustice. Unlike natural virtues, natural vices are not even prima facie 
desirable, but like natural virtues, they can lead to genuine vices. But unlike 
genuine vices, they bring lesser harm. Nothing I have said precludes the 
possibility that children do have natural vices.  
46
 But it is entirely unclear what purpose it would serve in NE VI.12-13. If we revisit the 46
thought experiment in a purely abstract way, we can see how the combination of 
“natural vices & inefficiency in deliberation” actually occupies one extreme along the 
spectrum, with “proper virtues & excellence in deliberation” occupying another. While 
each of the two remaining possibilities in the middle has its respective role to play 
(“genuine vices & excellence in deliberation” and “natural virtues & inefficiency in 
deliberation), it seems that the combination “natural vices & inefficiency in 
deliberation” appeared on the list just to complete the taxonomy. Maybe the 
distinction between natural virtues and natural vices can serve to remind us of this: 
even though Aristotle had argued that natural virtues of children are (potentially) 
harmful, he did not mean to say they are utterly undesirable. For after all, given that 
Aristotle had already envisioned the possibility of a clever villain, it is not unintelligible 
to push the taxonomy further and discuss if they can be children who are born with 
natural vices. But he did not mention anything like this. And anyway this is just 
speculating. 
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2.2.3 “Quasi-virtues”: how children do have virtues in some sense 
  So we must not only rely on NE VI.13 in trying to extract Aristotle’s 
conception of children. We must start again. Let’s make a terminological 
point first: let us distinguish quasi-virtues and natural virtues (as 
characterised NE VI. 13). I need the quasi-virtues to play these roles: i) they 
are equally attributable to human adults and children, and ii) they are 
indicative of the fact that there is something in human nature that is 
unequivocally/non-defectively aiming at virtues. I now argue: children do 
possess these “quasi-virtues”. 

  We may begin by exploring an area closely related to ethics. In Pol.I.2, 
Aristotle claimed that “the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by 
nature a political animal” (1253a4). What does this mean? By the context it 
is clear that Aristotle was referring to some tendencies toward forming and 
living in a political community (1253a29–30). However, as Richard Kraut 
pointed out, comparing to Aristotle’s other remarks on our nature, namely, 
our nature to learn (Meta.980a1) and our nature to imitate others (Poet.
1448b4-9), it is not immediately self-evident that our nature towards a 
political community “have the same ring of truth”. In particular, it is not self-
evident that children do exhibit the impulses toward a political community 
as strong as they exhibit the impulses toward knowledge and imitation.  47
How, then, should we make sense of the claim that man is by nature a 
political animal? Note that this is parallel to the case of virtues. We are 
interested in how children can have virtues if, according to NE VI.13, the 
 Kraut (2007, 200). 47
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natural qualities that they have are defective. Yet all the same we are 
looking for the manifestation of virtues in children, manifestation that can 
vindicate the claim that there is something inherent in humans that is 
unequivocally aiming at virtues. Similarly, we ask now how children can 
exhibit the same kind of tendencies toward political community, tendencies 
that can vindicate the claim that man is by nature political. 

   Kraut’s aim is to make sense of Aristotle’s claim about human nature, and 
his solution is that we should distinguish two ways a given state or 
tendency can be regarded as “natural”. The first and dominant way is to see 
whether it is present at the beginning of our lives. But a state can also be 
“natural” “if it is not the product of reasoning or any other conscious effort 
to summon it into existence” : it is developed without special intervention. 48
So, although children may not exhibit any tendencies toward a political 
community, and citizens can be politically indifferent, there is still a sense in 
which man is by nature a political animal, because once the suitable 
enabling conditions are in place - say, when the children become more 
mature and intelligent - the relevant tendencies will show themselves 
without further reasoning or any other conscious efforts. 

    For Kraut’s purpose it suffices to argue that man has a tendency towards 
political community only in the second sense. Still, it makes sense to ask if 
there is anything about the agents that makes them sensitive to those 
enabling conditions. And indeed, Kraut has argued to this effect. For he 
goes on to suggest that normal agents do show minimal “trust, good will, 
 Kraut (2007, 204). 48
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and friendliness”  to each other. At first this occurs within the family circle, 49
then to strangers and finally even to members of the same species (NE 
1155a16–24). There are “trust, good will, and friendliness” in children, at 
least to their family members, maybe also to the local community. If we 
allow these qualities to be counted as some primitive manifestation of 
political tendencies, then in effect we have argued that there are political 
tendencies in man in both senses of the word “natural”. This is of particular 
importance to us, since we now have some natural tendencies that are 
attributable to children and adults alike, and they vindicate a claim about 
human nature. To complete the story, Kraut argued that under proper 
enabling conditions, one’s trust, goodwill and friendliness towards his 
fellowmen will lead to the formation of a political community . 
50
   Kraut did not emphasise this point, but I think it is safe to assume that 
these political  tendencies are not defective. If so, these political tendencies 
might be called the “seeds” of political community. I propose, then, that the 
“seeds” of genuine virtues should be understood similarly. Quasi-virtues 
are: a) non-defective, b) equally attributable to adults and children, and c) 
 Kraut (2007, 204-6). 49
 Families are also the product of a non-intellectual impulse to maintain a household 50
(Pol. 1252a28–30).
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indicative of how there is something inherent in human nature that is 
unequivocally aiming at virtues . 
51
   What are the examples of these quasi-virtues? As “it is right to call things 
after the ends they realize” (DA. 416b23), let’s think of what ends they can 
serve. For instance, a caring and considerate tendency might be the seed 
of friendliness, a tendency to impose order and structure in one’s daily life 
might be the seed of temperance, a tendency to look for fair treatment and 
acknowledge others’ point of view might be the seed of justice. Quasi-
virtues, though imperfect, cannot be defective (vice-conducive) as they are 
identified in relation to the proper ends. This confirms condition (a). 

   Let us proceed to condition (b). Quasi-virtues are attributable to children 
because they are only the primitive manifestation of proper virtues, not the 
proper virtues themselves. Just like the seeds of political community - trust, 
good will and friendliness - are not what build a good community (i.e. 
justice), quasi-virtues should not be confused with proper virtues. We can, 
then, avoid the conclusion of NE VI.13 (that children do not have virtues), 
 Despite drawing on the parallel between ethics and politics, there remains one 51
important difference: Aristotle believed that humans will gather and form some sort of 
political community unless prevented. But the same is not true for virtues: NE II.1 
argued that, unlike our senses which “we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit 
the activity”, virtues can be developed only through practice (1103a26-1103b2). 
Virtues, then, do not just come forth whenever there is no impediment. But this 
difference should not undermine my claim. For a) arguably, NE II.1 is referring to full 
virtues, and that we need to practice to develop full virtues. But this is compatible with 
claiming that there are “seeds” in us that allow us to practice in the relevant ways or 
explain why we are inclined to certain practices in the first place. b) “Practice” is not 
required in the case of forming political community in the sense that living such a 
communal life is more the direct expression of human nature as political animal than 
marking some form of excellence, whereas full virtue presumably requires practices. 
So we can preserve the difference between the political nature and the “ethical nature” 
of humans with respect to the question of whether conscious practices are needed, 
while keeping the similarity between them with respect to whether humans are 
unequivocally prone toward the relevant target.
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while at the same time preserving its main insight (that there is a difference 
between the virtues of adult and the quasi-virtues of children). On the other 
hand, quasi-virtues are such that they are equally attributable to adults 
when the adults are already in a position to acquire proper virtues. For 
proper virtues are mature developments of the quasi-virtues; the two are 
not in opposition to each other . Just as it is the same trust, good will and 52
friendliness that are expressed when and after one started to live in a 
political community, it is the same quasi-virtues, with increased 
psychological depth, that are expressed in the case of adults. (That is, I do 
not mean to suggest that there are two kinds of virtues, proper ones and the 
quasi ones, but only that there can be primitive manifestation of proper 
virtues, and such manifestation is the quasi-virtues).

   We may elaborate condition (c) by observing that the quasi-virtues will 
lead to proper virtues if the circumstances are favourable to their 
expression. Just as one’s trust, goodwill and friendliness will lead to the 
formation of political communities when the material, social, and 
institutional conditions are in place, the quasi-virtues will lead to their 
corresponding proper virtues once the enabling conditions are satisfied. If 
we are focusing on natural virtues, failures to achieve excellence are 
attributed to internal defects (as in NE VI.13). By contrast, in the case of 
quasi-virtues they are attributed to the external circumstances. This 
 The difference between the character of children and adults, I suspect, concerns the 52
psychological depth these character states may have. That is, in the case of adults, 
the virtues have much more intimate connection with other psychological states 
(beliefs, attitudes, emotions, inclinations, etc.), and thus much more complicated 
psychological roles. This is in line with what I have said in the previous chapter: virtues 
inform our evaluation of ends and patterns of reasoning.
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registers the reliance of the development of the virtues on the 
circumstances. (We will come back to a more elaborate account of this 
reliance at a later part of this chapter). The ideal society, then, must be such 
that it allows for the full expressions of the quasi-virtues; conversely, the 
properly developed quasi-virtues are also what realise a good political 
constitution (NE 1103b3-6). At this point the individual’s and the legislator’s 
point of view converge. 

2.2.4 Innate predispositions? (Nature and habits) 
    Now it’s time to return to the question I left unanswered at the end of ch.
1. The worry is that since quasi-virtues seem to be natural tendencies, and 
since “natural” tendencies include innate predispositions, and given the 
observation that different people are influenced by different innate 
predispositions (in different degree), does that mean not everyone has an 
equal start in terms of character development? Is it the case that some 
people have a better (or worse) start as a matter of innate predispositions? 

   This is a difficult issue. For on the one hand, it seems unrealistic to deny 
the relevance of innate predispositions, yet on the other, we tend to have 
egalitarian conceptions of moral practice: everyone, if he wants, can 
change his character. This seems to be the message of NE III.5, where 
Aristotle argued that we are responsible for our character. 

   But go back to quasi-virtues. Quasi-virtues are “bi-faceted”: on the one 
hand, they are not defective and therefore are the proper precursors of 
genuine virtues, on the other, they are natural and therefore accessible even 
to children. They are more easily felt/awaken/planted. Consequently, they 
 of 57 147
are the promising entry points when we are trying to develop some virtues 
or correct some character flaws. 

  Consider the child who apparently is not as caring as others. The robust 
and intelligent nature of genuine virtue prevents any quick and mechanical 
way to acquire the virtue. As the child is not intellectually ready, critical 
practice might also not be an option at the moment. Neither can we simply 
assert that certain responses and attitudes are required, for even if the child 
does take them seriously and follow them, this sounds rather dogmatic. But 
one strategy is viable: first, we identify the quasi-virtues corresponding to 
genuine care. Then, we identify the circumstances or conditions favourable 
to the expression of such quasi-virtues. Suppose we agree that some sort 
of emphatic interests in others’ fate (e.g. the love of stories) is the quasi-
virtue corresponding to genuine care. Then we proceed to identify the 
circumstances favourable to the expression of such interests, e.g. having a 
vivid imagination and perception of the subject-matter; learning how to 
relate the subject-matter to one’s own life; maybe even just having enough 
leisure. Having set the suitable stage, we are more confident to say that the 
child is on the right track in developing the virtue. 

   Let’s relate this to the problem of innate predispositions. To sharpen the 
issue, let’s consider quasi-vices. When the influences of innate 
predispositions take the form of quasi-vices, educational strategies that aim 
at activating the corresponding quasi-virtues should be able to counter 
them. Since they are both quasi-character-traits, by themselves they are of 
equal strength or weights. Much then, depends on whether the 
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circumstances are favourable, i.e. the cultural context one is embedded in. 
When the influences of innate predispositions take the form of genuine 
vices, as products of both quasi-vices and bad habits, as it is in the case of 
the badly brought up adult  (NE 1114a3-1114a21), one might need to 53
undergo a more radical change. For instance, one might need to identify a 
list of quasi-virtues and their favourable circumstances and plan one’s daily 
life accordingly. That is, one will need to immerse oneself into a very 
different context. 

    We can be realistic enough to acknowledge the influences of these innate 
predispositions, either as quasi-character-traits per se or as genuine-
character-traits that are developed from the corresponding quasi-character-
traits; but we can also maintain an egalitarian conception of moral practice, 
by pinpointing the viable entry point for character cultivation. 

    So, quasi-virtues can be a proper non-intellectual starting-point of virtue 
education. This in turn suggests that human beings are by nature prone to 
virtue in the sense that our nature has done us the favour of equipping us to 
be susceptible to the right circumstances. The cultural context one is 
immersed in is part and parcel of such circumstances. Nature and habits 
cooperate with each other, then, since the process of habituation-
 I am assuming that there are no genuine vices at the early stages, just as there are 53
no genuine virtues at the early stages. 
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immersion is precisely to give shape to the seeds of virtues . This is how I 54
think we should understand the claim “we are adapted by nature to receive 
them [virtues], and are made perfect by habit” (NE 1103a25).  The take-55
home message is that there are primitive non-intellectual manifestations of 
human nature - so primitive that they can be exhibited in children.

2.3 “Children” in virtue education 
2.3.1 Aristotle’s defence of the nuclear family  
  Whether one becomes virtuous or vicious depends to a considerable 
extent on the environment. But how should we understand such 
“environment” (as Aristotle conceived of it)? And what happens to the child 
living in the environment so construed? I should first emphasise one 
indispensable component: the role of the nuclear family. In later sections, I 
will briefly explain the extension to other communities. 

  Aristotle had, as we know, defended the ethical and educational 
importance of the nuclear family when arguing against Plato. In the 
Republic, Plato proposed that children and wives and everyone’s property 
 The contrast drawn between virtues and senses in NE 1103a26-1103b2 is still very 54
real. Although the quasi-virtues are in a sense already “in us”, we do not “have” them 
in the way we already have, e.g. sight. For certain material and institutional conditions 
have to be realised before the quasi-virtues can have their unimpeded expressions, 
yet no similar (or at any rate no similarly stringent) prerequisite are needed for us to 
use the senses. But all the same both the senses and the quasi-virtues can still be 
qualified as potentialities that are endowed “by nature”. For “we had them before we 
used them”. We do not need to practice our senses before we can have them, and we 
do not need critical practices to summon the quasi-virtues into existence. To complete 
the story, the things that “we get by first exercising them” must be the expressions of 
the quasi-virtues in one’s activities and responses.
 Nothing in my argument prevent the same conclusion about vices: there are quasi-55
vices manifested in children and they are part of human nature. If so, Aristotle must 
have something else in mind, or was exaggerating when he said in the EE that “wish is 
of the good naturally, but of the bad contrary to nature, and by nature one wishes the 
good, but contrary to nature and through perversion the bad as well.” (1227a28-30). 
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should be shared by everyone living in the city (or at least in the Guardian 
class). Marriages are arranged by the state, and offspring are raised by 
supervisors (457c-461e). The initial motivation is to counter factionalism. 
The hope is that one can thereby foster the highest degree of sympathy, 
impartiality, even single-mindedness among citizens . All will speak and 56
feel with one voice. Nuclear family is an obvious obstacle to this goal. 

  Aristotle’s main argument  turns on defending the right conception about 57
the intimate relation (philia or “friendship”) that connects parents and 
children. Here is the crucial passage:

“Whereas in a state having women and children in common, love will 
be diluted…As a little sweet wine mingled with a great deal of water 
is imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of community, the 
idea of relationship which is based upon these names will be lost; 
there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the 
son, or the son about the father, or brothers about one another. Of 
the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection—that a 
thing is your own and that it is precious—neither can exist in such a 
state as this [i.e. Plato’s one].” (Pol. 1262b17-24)

   The main idea is that familial relations are built upon a certain kind of self-
referential attachment: that the son or daughter is my son or daughter, not 
everyone else’s, that the parents are my parents, not everyone else’s. These 
are the relationships naturally denoted by these names, and it is in such 
self-referential attachment that the participants develop “regard and 
 Kraut (2002, 312). 56
 Aristotle also noted practical difficulties such as the impossibility to eliminate 57
evidence about blood relations (because of physical resemblances between family 
members 1162a14-24, and knowledge possessed by those who are responsible for 
removing the newborn babies from the parents 1262b24-9). 
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affection”. But for such relation to take place, two conditions have to be 
met: that the object of the attachment belongs to one and that it is 
precious. 

   By “precious” (agapeton) Aristotle here meant something like “special”, 
“satisfying to have”, even “indispensable” (though it may not be uniquely 
indispensable, for such kind of attachment is applicable also to sibling 
love).  Note that the two conditions are distinct from each other. The first 58
condition concerns whether the object is exclusively owned by the person 
in question or collectively owned by many. The second condition concerns 
whether the person stands in the same relation with only a few objects or 
many .
59
  In effect, the argument is that Plato’s ideal city violates both of the 
conditions. That it violates the first is quite clear: since all children (and 
wives) are commonly owned, each of them does not belong to any single 
individual. Consequently, Aristotle said in an earlier section, this will lead to 
the lack of sufficient care to every individual child, for “everybody is more 
inclined to neglect something which he expects another to fulfil”; children 
 Sherman (1989, 146). 58
 Sherman (1989, 147). Aristotle seemed to assume that one’s care and attention to 59
anything “precious” is limited, such that one cannot find too many things each 
precious in its own way without spreading the love too thin.
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will “be neglected by all alike” (1261b32-40), “love will be diluted” . Plato’s 60
proposal also violates the second condition because in his ideal city 
everyone owns others’ - more precisely, all - children (and wives and 
properties). Consequently, there is nothing special about having children - in 
other words, individual child is not indispensable to individual parent. I 
suppose this will equally lead to lack of sufficient care, but Aristotle did not 
spell out this connection. At any rate, it leads to a different problem: given 
the dispensability of the object, there is nothing special that the child is 
one’s child (since the entire younger generation is), and there is nothing 
special that the parents are one’s parents (since the entire older generation 
is) . Plato’s proposal in effect eliminates the self-referential element in 61
familial relations. 
   Notably, Aristotle’s defence of the self-referential attachments involved in 
familial relation parallels his understanding of how the child develops 
discriminatory cognition. In a passage already quoted before, the child 
“begins by calling all men father, and all women mother, but later on 
 In fairness to Plato, Kraut pointed out that Plato need not be taken to suggest that 60
the whole community is taking care of the whole generation. Rather, he can just mean 
there will be trained groups designed specifically to take care of the offspring. This 
alternative sufficed to answer Aristotle’s objection without granting Aristotle’s own 
solution, namely, to preserve traditional families. For traditional families are connected 
by blood relation, and presumably the group trained for child care does not relate to 
the children by blood. This shows that Aristotle had tacitly assumed that normal 
human children will receive the love they need and grow best in the care of their 
biological parents. See Kraut (2002, 317). 
 This is further illustrated by pointing out an ambiguity in the phrase “all children are 61
mine”. Plato’s Socrates meant to take it to say “each and every child is mine”, 
intending that every each parents will love every each member of the entire generation 
in the same way parents love their own children in traditional families. But the “all” in 
the phrase can also be taken not individually (as in “each and every”), but collectively, 
in which case it is the collection of all children, not anyone in particular, that is mine 
(1261b20-30). Of the former reading, Aristotle replied that it is desirable but 
impossible. The latter, on the other hand, makes each individual child dispensable. 
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distinguishes each of them (Phy. 184b13-14)”. The ability to call one 
particular woman/man as my mother/father is the cognitive basis of the 
self-referential attachment. 
62
2.3.2 Exposure to evaluative experiences and private education  
   It is safe to assume that what matters is not just the natural familial roles 
and relations, but the unique interactions and histories between family 
members that materialise these roles and relations. It is these interactions 
and histories that really constitute the intimate and affective philia. With 
respect to the parents, “they [parents] are the causes of their [children’s] 
being and of their nourishment, and of their education from their birth” (NE 
1162a6-7), and they (though Aristotle only mentioned father here) will “feel a 
sort of kindness towards the son as being his own production, led on by 
memory and by hope” (MM 1211b37-8). While parents will love their 
children as “part of themselves” or as “other selves” (1161b17-24) as soon 
as they are born, children’s love and attachments, on the other hand, will 
start to grow only when “they have acquired understanding or 
perception” (1161b26). This suggests that it is through living in the familial 
environment, established precisely through the intimate interactions 
 One wonders what would be the parallel case in Plato’s city. One might suggest that 62
the child does not need to distinguish between men, since all are equally one’s father. 
Alternatively, the child may need to focus on some men, say, men of certain age, in 
which case he or she will need to exercise discriminatory cognition to some extent. 
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characteristic of the special/precious familial relations, that the child is 
developing the self-referential attachments to his parents and siblings . 
63
   Aristotle did not explicitly discuss this, but it is reasonable to expect that 
the nuclear family will provide the child with the first exposure to various 
kinds of evaluative experience. Nurtured and raised by tailor-made care and 
attention (NE 1180b11), he or she will experience those emotions, attitudes 
and the phenomenology distinctive of (what he or she will later know as) 
love. Given Aristotle’s differentiation of men’s and women’s virtues (Pol. 
1159b51-9), there may even be a division of labour between mother and 
father concerning different evaluative issues. The mother, given her feminine 
sensitivities, will bring with her all sorts of virtues involving mercifulness, 
thoughtfulness, tolerance, helpfulness, etc. Given her daily presence in the 
household, she will also develop a more intimate understanding of the 
child . These will be of extreme importance for the growth of the child’s 64
heart and mind, for the child will face obstacles and has to learn from 
mistakes, not to mention the fact that he or she will be too immature to 
explain him- or herself. The variety of “feminine virtues” will also prove to be 
valuable in the child’s future social and political life.  The father, on the 65
other hand, despite his relative absence in the private sphere, will be more 
Thus even when Aristotle used those seemingly biological terms - “production” and 63
“origination” - to describe the relation between parents and children, it is more about 
the activities and efforts involved in giving birth than it is about the biological bondage 
(which is also the reason why, Aristotle said, mothers are more attached to the child 
than the fathers are, 1168a21-7). See Sherman (1989, 149). Biological connection will 
have some roles to play, but it is not the only factor.
 Sherman (1989, 150).64
 Sherman (1989, 154). 65
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likely to be the source of authority and rules. This fits with Aristotle’s 
thought that, in the household, the man is supposed to give commands 
(Pol. 1159b59). This is of equal importance to the child’s development, for in 
perceiving the prescriptive force of authority he learns to regulate his own 
behaviour, and in abiding by the rules he learns that there must be order 
and restrictions in life. 

  Aristotle’s argument against Plato’s abolition of the nuclear family is 
embedded in his wider discussion about the ethical importance of private 
education: “Just as lawful things and habits have strength in cities, so in 
households do paternal words and habits, still more strength, in fact, 
because of the kinship and the benefactions involved, since children are 
naturally predisposed to feel affection and be ready to obey” (NE 1180b 
4-7). At first sight it is a matter of educating with higher efficiency. For given 
the love, respect and trust enshrined in familial relations, the child is more 
willing to learn and follow the rules, and he or she may even absorb faster 
and better than if the education is conducted and supervised by 
professional experts. Closer and more intimate interactions with the child 
result in a more personalised program and method of virtue inculcation (NE 
1180b8-12). But, as we have seen, the nuclear family is important also 
because it provides the child with the first exposure to all kinds of 
evaluative experience. 

  Compare the kind of value private education may instil with the value 
instructed by Plato’s state-supervised public education. As we know, the 
purpose of that education is to build a strictly impartial and collective 
 of 66 147
mindset. By contrast, it is interpersonal love, the “feminine virtues”, respect, 
and aspiration that private education is capable of inculcating . In other 66
words, as is often pointed out, Aristotle’s defence of traditional families is 
simultaneously a defence of the intrinsic goodness of these intimate human 
relations (or intimate aspects of human lives) . This is not at all surprising. 67
For as we can see from his thematic discussion of friendship, Aristotle 
believed that human beings have a deep desire and need for being part of a 
long-term and committed relationship. He said, for instance, that “a god is 
not such as to need a friend…with us welfare involves a something beyond 
us, but the deity is his own well-being” (EE 1245b15-20). In fact, the 
number of true friendships any individual can have is highly limited, for each 
requires a lot of devotion (NE 1171a1-15). On the other hand, in Plato’s 
Symposium, Diotima requires the proper course of love to ascend from 
particular individuals to the universal and repeatable qualities that are 
instantiated not just in persons but also in impersonal embodiments such 
as sciences (210a-212a). 

2.3.3 Solidarity vs. Loyalty? 
  The contrast between the inculcation of the values of partiality and 
impartiality invites the following elaboration. Different virtues address 
different evaluative concerns. Was Aristotle’s defence of the value of 
traditional families also a defence of a specific (set of) virtue(s)? Here is my 
 This is not to say, for Aristotle, each nuclear family can decide for their own what to 66
teach to their children. In NE X.9 and Pol.VIII.1, Aristotle argued that the program of 
moral education should be determined by the state. It is just that the execution of 
such program should be channelled through the nuclear family. At any rate, it is quite 
different from Plato’s idea of building collective single-mindedness. 
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suggestion. From the individual’s point of view, self-referential attachment 
requires solidarity but collective single-mindedness requires loyalty. 

   By “solidarity” I mean the kind of fellow feeling that connects people as 
members of a common community. Aristotle did say, for instance, “in every 
community there seems to be some sort of justice and some sort of 
friendship as well. At any rate, people address their fellow sailors or fellow 
soldiers as friends” (NE 1160a24-8). Here he used the word 
“justice”(dikaion), but at any rate it should be distinguished from “general 
justice” discussed in NE V. 1. On the one hand, it is, I assume, like a form of 
general justice (as opposed to the particular forms of justice, namely, 
distributive and rectificatory justice) in that it asks for general respect for 
those who are concerned. But on the other, it differs from general justice as 
such because it can be parochial, whereas general justice requires respect 
for all. Further, fellow feeling also asks for relation-specific expression, since 
what is just differs for different relationships (NE 1159b35-1160a2), and the 
same unjust act is more unjust if it is done to a friend (1160a2-6). 

   Aristotle did explicitly mention a similar objection when he argued against 
Plato in Pol. II.4. The abolition of traditional families runs counter to some of 
our moral intuitions: assaults and homicides, quarrels and slanders, these 
acts are most unholy when done against family members, but not equally 
unholy when there is no such relation (1262a25-8). Partiality expressed in 
intimate relations matters. Further, Aristotle believed that these unholy acts 
will happen more often if the traditional families are abolished, for people 
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wil l not be “afraid of committ ing any crimes by reason of 
consanguinity” (1262b37). 

   How should we interpret this point? It is not as if individuals unimpressed 
by the injustice of these acts will refrain from doing them because they 
realise that if the acts were done against one’s own family member it would 
be horrible. So Aristotle said abolishing familial roles and relations would 
make the unholy acts happen more often, not that it would cause these new 
crimes, meaning that there are such acts anyway. But how does the 
existence of nuclear families help? Given what I have said about how the 
family inculcates certain values, I suggest that the nuclear family as an 
institution helps to shape moral intuitions and to make more concrete what 
“common sense” may ask us to think.

   As we have seen, Aristotle believed that intimate human relations have 
intrinsic value. That means the ethical value of family is itself one of the 
traditional values shaped and preserved by “nuclear family” as an 
institution. According to this interpretation, then, Aristotle’s objection seems 
to be: citizens in Plato’s city will not be “afraid of committing any crimes by 
reason of consanguinity” because such particularly unholy acts will not go 
against their common sense. After all, in Plato’s city, everyone is supposed 
to identify himself with the single unified mind of the state, and if it so 
happens that the state calls for killing one’s biological family member, it 
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would not be against one’s common sense to do so. Presumably, Aristotle 
was saying this horribly distorts what is naturally just . 
68
  “Natural”, that is, in the sense that it is grounded on deep human 
psychology, as opposed to any abstract principle or conventional standard. 
As we have mentioned, this is a characteristic of Aristotle’s theory of 
friendship. In other words, then, Aristotle’s defence of the ethical value of 
traditional family is also a defence of what is naturally just, that is, what we 
should think of as commonsensical. “Solidarity” is my best attempt to 
capture the specific quality of character that commits oneself to this sense 
of “(natural) justice”. Solidarity expresses one’s self-referential attachment 
to one’s fellow colleagues (soldiers, sailors, in Aristotle’s original example): 
these are my friends. As fellow feeling expresses the bond between agents 
of equal status, Aristotelian ethical community is egalitarian in spirit. By 
contrast, earlier in Republic IV, Plato argued that justice consists in each 
part of the soul - and by analogy, every class of the city - making its own 
proper contribution to the active life of the whole agent (city) whose soul it 
is (433a-434d). Plato’s justice consists in what unifies all walks of life. To be 
sure the different social classes in Plato’s city are not identical to each 
other, so there is diversity. But in Plato’s framework, only the ruling class 
can possess wisdom, whose role is to prescribe or command (428b-429a). 
The subjects, on the other hand, though they may have some room for 
discretion, are strictly speaking not supposed to exercise their ability to 
 Apparently, Aristotle believed that Plato’s system would give rise to more acts of 68
incest, and this is objectively bad. Presumably, this judgment of the badness of incest 
is part of what Aristotelian common sense teaches.
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judge (or do not have such ability at all). It is “loyalty” rather than solidarity 
that is inculcated in this scheme: everyone wholeheartedly embraces this 
multifaceted (in terms of division of labour) single unity and obeys the 
command coming from a single source. The quality of character promoted 
in this city is at the bottom paternalistic, as opposed to egalitarian. So it is 
not at all surprising that there will be no conflicts of common sense, for in 
the end there is only one common sense. This seems to be the logical 
consequence of collective single-mindedness. The debate between 
Aristotle and Plato concerning whether to preserve the intrinsic value of 
(different forms of) intimate human relationships or to secure the absolute 
unity/collective single-mindedness of the state, then, turns out to be a 
debate between whether to promote egalitarian or paternalistic virtues. 

2.3.4 Extending solidarity 
   I have over-simplified. Though all counted as forms of philia , there are 69
important differences between the parents-children relation, the friendships 
between siblings, and those friendships outside the family circle. In the 
course of the development of virtue, at least after children have reached a 
 In fact, ideally, friendship as such demands absolute equality - of status, of 69
goodness, of given and received, of pleasure or advantage (if it is that kind of 
friendship) (NE 1158b30-33). The inequality between parents and children, elder to 
younger, man and wife, and ruler to subject (NE 1158b12-28), then, make their 
friendships at best a deviant case. 
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certain age (starting from puberty, most likely), friendships of brothers and 
comrades play indispensable roles .
70
   However, it is important to note that the notion of natural justice - and 
therefore the character of solidarity - is neutral between equal and unequal 
friendship. Of course, since the community of equals and of unequals 
differs, what is just in the two cases also differs. So the application/
realisation of natural justice can differ between these communities. Further, 
some contexts may even ask us to treat a whole community as sharing 
equal status with another community, despite the unequal relations within 
each of the community. Thinking of the family as a unit, existing alongside 
other families, the inequality between the elder and the younger within each 
family may not be relevant, for it can just signify differences concerning the 
division of labour, not the status. The child can achieve something for the 
family which the parents cannot, and vice versa. For instance, Aristotle 
spoke of how “children seem to be a bond of union…for children are a 
good common to bo th and wha t i s common ho lds them 
together” (1162a27-9). Children may be a lot weaker and less mature, but 
that just means their contributions to the family are going to be very 
 These friendships are at least as important as, if not more important than, the philia 70
between parents and children. Similarity in character and background binds them, 
makes them more likely to understand each other; similarity in age means they are 
undergoing similar process of physio-psychological development (which is something 
the parents can never join); assuming that they make friends within the normal social 
circle, they will share similar past and/or future experiences, which further enhance 
their fellow feelings. Further, some experiences characteristic of some virtues are 
possible only among friends with equal status. For example, sharing and keeping 
secrets test trustworthiness, and watching each other’s back means supporting one’s 
brother(s) or comrades (the superior does not need the inferior to watch his back). 
Finally, since friendships of comrades are products of one’s choice (which makes it 
different from that of brothers), and since learning to make good choices is itself a 
crucial lesson in acquiring virtues, the experience of making friends is itself ethically 
important.
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different from that of the parents. At any rate, they are all part of one family 
(a small “community”) and as such there can be fellow feelings between 
them. Similarly, thinking of the state as a unit, existing alongside other 
states, the inequality between rulers and subjects within each state may not 
be relevant. Further, there can be contexts where we need to appeal to the 
most fundamental status in forming the community, that is, the status of 
being a human. In this case, inequalities we mentioned so far between the 
different roles dissolved.  

  Notably, all these cases ask us to somehow go beyond the apparent 
inequality and realise that at a different level, we can reasonably regard 
those originally unequal friendships as constituting part of a larger equal 
friendship. In light of this, I suggest, the essence of solidarity is still the 
friendships between equals, but its expression need not be confined to 
conventional social roles. Rather, the key is to be able to see at which level 
and context which community can be regarded as a unit, and thus what 
apparent inequality can be dismissed as irrelevant. 

  Aristotle nowhere says this, but I think it is reasonable to elaborate as 
follows. I suggest, to be able to go beyond the conventional social roles 
and look for a higher level of equality (thus of solidarity) is itself a crucial 
step in the course of virtue development. For one thing, as non-familial 
community is typically bound by some common purpose or goal (NE 
1160a9-1160a31), the child’s attempts to go beyond the family circle is 
simultaneously an attempt to inquire into or further understand the 
purposes of different human activities. As for Aristotle the purpose of 
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something is closely related to its value, finding the right non-conventional 
community is itself an attempt to understand the values of things. Relatedly, 
going beyond the conventional roles itself broaden one’s horizon. One can 
then start to approach others with an eye to their character (or at any rate 
the purpose of their choices and actions as they understand them), instead 
of their social status. 

   Further, developing solidarity with people outside the family circle is itself 
morally significant. Aristotle envisaged the circle of friendship going from 
family to the entire human race: “It [friendship] seems to exist by nature in a 
parent’s relation to offspring and offspring’s relation to parent, not only 
among humans but also among birds and most animals, and among 
members of the same species, and especially among humans —which is 
why we praise those who love humankind (philanthrôpous) (NE 
1155a16-24)”. Given what I have said about dismissing apparent 
inequalities as irrelevant, extending one’s circle of solidarity is itself a step 
towards an egalitarian ideal - an ideal where we (realistically) acknowledge 
differences in background, talents, resources, etc., but withhold the 
conclusion that these constitute unequal moral status. I will further 
elaborate some of these themes in the last chapter. 

   Note the connection between this account of extending solidarity with a 
thesis I argued in the previous chapter: that the child learns through 
imitation rather than critical attempts to approximate an ideal model. It is 
not like the child will already have some plans in mind, informed by the ideal 
model he identifies, then he begins to search for the candidate communities 
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according to the plans. Rather, the child is developing his understanding of 
purpose and values as he navigates through the different people and 
different groups he meets. The interdependence between the process of 
blending into any community and the process of understanding (of values, 
purpose) shows that the critical practice model is too intellectual to be 
accurate.

2.3.5 How the state is a plurality and civic friendship 
   There is only one point left to elaborate. Aristotle’s defence of the ethical 
value of traditional families (and, by extension, intimate relations) is only one 
instance of a larger dispute. While Plato believed that “unity” is the only 
thing that builds and benefits a city, Aristotle asserted that “the nature of a 
state is to be a plurality” (Pol. 1261a17). “[A] state is not made up only of so 
many men, but of different kinds of men” (a21-28). The ideas of plurality 
and diversity are built into the notion of natural justice and solidarity. 
Accordingly, one can have solidarity with different communities.

  Consider how Aristotle gave his first objection to Plato’s obsession with 
unity: “in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, 
and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more 
one than the state, and the individual than the family” (Pol. 1261a17-20). As 
Kraut pointed out, Aristotle maybe assuming that the smaller the size of a 
group, the less it is possible for the group to be the “locus of disagreement 
and ill feeling” . Accordingly, Aristotle’s objection is that if it is unity one is 71
after, one should try to establish the smallest possible state, for in that case 
 Kraut (2002, 312). 71
 of 75 147
the possibility of disagreements and ill feelings are diminished, and the 
possibly of collective single-mindedness maximised. But in fact, this 
destroys the state, for obviously the reasoning does not stop to the smallest 
possible state: a family is even smaller, and an individual will be the most 
unitary. If this interpretation is correct, then, given Aristotle’s defence of 
plurality and diversity, one should expect that disagreements between 
different communities are allowed in Aristotle’s ideal polis. 

   But there is more. Recall, it is the fear of factionalism that motivates Plato 
in the first place. How will a plurality of different communities avoid that? 
Extending the scope of solidarity is part of the answer, but let us further 
consider one of Aristotle’s attempts to guarantee social cohesion in the city. 
In Aristotle’s ideal city, every citizen is supposed to meet each other at 
common meals, where they discuss issues, share feelings, enjoy 
entertainment, make fun of each other, most plausibly even gossip in a 
comfortable setting. They will also participate in religious and musical 
festivals together (NE 1160b25-7). All these lead to a particular form of 
philia: what Aristotle called civic friendship. Presumably, then, social 
cohesion is guaranteed and citizens of this city will not think only for 
themselves and their closest friends because of this civic friendship. 
Further, given differences in background, upbringing, social ties, 
experiences, etc., one need not expect that everyone will share the same 
view on most of the things, but all the same these disagreements are not 
likely to destroy the civic friendship. For one thing, they are all committed to 
the virtues and they understand that well-being consists in virtuous actives. 
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For another, although a fellow citizen is not as close as one’s family and 
friends, he is not a complete stranger, and it is reasonable to assume that 
this fellow will be “someone whose company one regularly enjoys”.  72
Aristotle seems to mean this is his way to replace Plato’s absolute unity 
(single-mindedness). If so, when arguing against treating unity as the sole 
criterion of the best city, and replacing it with civic friendship, Aristotle is in 
effect arguing that it is not beliefs or opinions that bind or divide people, it is 
rather character and shared activities. 

   This brings us back to the topic of virtue education. “The state, as I was 
saying, is a plurality, which should be united and made into a community by 
education; and it is strange that the author of a system of education which 
he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens 
by regulations of this sort [i.e. Plato’s proposal], and not by philosophy or by 
customs and laws” (Pol. 1263b35-9). Some sort of social cohesion is 
required. But as we have seen through the notion of civic friendship, this is 
not the same as Plato’s proposal of collective single-mindedness. By 
education, then, children will form civic friendship with his fellow citizens, 
but (in my own terms) this only requires solidarity, not loyalty. 

Recap 
    Let’s recap. I have elaborated on Aristotle’s defence of the ethical value 
of the nuclear family. I pointed out that it is embedded in the discussion of 
the ethical importance of private education. Since private education 
provides children with their first exposure to various kinds of evaluative 
 Kraut (2002, 321).72
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experience, Aristotle can also be seen as defending the intrinsic goodness 
of the intimate human relations enshrined in the traditional families. This fits 
well with his theory of friendship. Furthermore, I suggest that Aristotle was 
also defending a specific (set of) virtue(s), which I dubbed “solidarity”. In 
support of this view, I explored Aristotle’s discussion of how friendship and 
justice are interrelated. Aristotelian ethical community turns out to be 
egalitarian in nature. By contrast, Plato’s justice consists in the unity of all 
walks of life as they are governed by the ruling class, who is the only group 
in the state who possesses the wisdom to give judgment. Plato’s state is 
essentially paternalistic. Finally, I explored how extending the scope of 
solidarity is an important step in virtue education, and how civic friendship 
brings social cohesion, rather than absolute unity. 

    Let me connect the several themes discussed in these two chapters. As I 
said when I introduce the discussion of family, the initial point is to further 
elaborate the thesis that habituation is an immersion into the relevant 
context. We now know one of the crucial components in this “context” is 
the nuclear family, and, by extension, friendships of brothers, comrades, 
and civic friendship. In a word, the communities surrounding the younger 
generation. I have also explained how the account of extending solidarity 
can be seen as an extension of the argument against the practice of 
identifying ideal models. 

     Now, let me return to my working hypothesis. I have argued that children 
do possess quasi-virtues/vices, and thus, to repeat the hypothesis, part of 
understanding how virtues (or vices) are human excellence (deficiency), that 
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is, how they are excellence that expresses the nature of such beings who 
are born under-developed, involves understanding how there are 
manifestations of these character states in the stage of childhood. Recall 
that my argument turns on an analogy between the seeds of virtues and the 
seeds of forming a political community. Now, given what I have said about 
solidarity, we can see how it is not merely an analogy. That is, the parallel 
between human propensities to political community and analogous 
propensities to virtues actually points to a more general truth: the human 
develops virtues (or vices) in forming communities. So, my working 
hypothesis can be reformulated as: “part of understanding how virtues (or 
vices) are human excellence (deficiency),…involves understanding how 
there are manifestations of these character states in the stage of childhood, 
as it is embedded in the (familial and non-familial) communities.” So 
solidarity is also an expression of human nature. Virtues and vices are 
expressive of the nature of this peculiar political animal . This in turn points 73
to a connection between the “habituation-immersion” thesis and the 
working hypothesis of this chapter. Habituation involves immersing into the 
familial and non-familial communities, human virtues and vices are (as an 
expression of human nature) developed in forming such communities, thus 
habituation is also expressing our nature as a political animal. This 
reconfirms and further illustrates a point I made earlier: habituation and 
nature work together.  
 As Gottlieb remarked: “Neither human virtue nor human vice are possible without 73
the polis. The polis enables humans to be both virtuous and vicious” (2009, 194). 
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Chapter 3  Practical Induction 
Introduction 
  This chapter brings in some relatively new materials. I will discuss 
Aristotle’s theory of “practical induction”. In a way, we can see clear 
continuity: as I will talk about the “starting-point” of reasoning, and as 
Aristotle believed that habituation informs one of the starting-point of 
deliberation, it will be an extended topic of Chapter 1 (see esp. section 
1.1.4 “Character informs the evaluation of specific ends”) Indeed, as we 
shall see at the end of this chapter, the debate in the first chapter extends 
to a debate between two positions in this one. But the materials are new in 
the sense that I have not discussed in the previous chapters about how 
exactly does the agent grasp the starting-point of reasoning. Further, as we 
shall see, in theorising practical induction there is a position according to 
which the starting-point of reasoning is not “(action-guiding) ends”, but 
intuition about the essence of the ends. This goes beyond the notion of 
habituation as we know it. So there is discontinuity, too. As these new 
materials direct us to a new path with some clear references to the previous 
chapters, the next chapter will bring the whole discussion into its finale. 

   But to focus on this chapter, in what follows I shall proceed as follows. 
After a preliminary section explaining the basic notion of “practical 
induction” (3.1), I will proceed to contrast two different accounts, namely, 
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the Socratic conception and Jessica Moss’ account. According to the 
former (3.2), practical induction leads us to intuition about essences of the 
relevant subject-matter (nature of specific virtues, eudaimonia, etc.), while 
according to the latter (3.3), practical induction leads us to evaluative 
appearances. Quite roughly, the difference is epitomised in the difference 
between emphasising reflectiveness and emphasising truthfulness as the 
mark of ideal character. I will end by drawing a relation between the 
positions discussed in Chapter 1 and the positions discussed in this 
chapter (3.4). 

3.1 Preliminaries  
  In Aristotle’s framework, “induction” is the method or process through 
which the “starting-point” is grasped (APo.II.19; NE1098b3; 1151a15-19). 
As such, it is distinguished from “deduction” or “demonstration”, the 
syllogistic process of reasoning that proceeds from the starting premise to 
the final conclusion (APo. 71a1-8). The theory of induction, then, is 
supposed to explain our “understanding” or “intuition”, or at any rate the 
kind of intellectual activity that cannot be (fully) captured by syllogistic 
inferences (NE1139b29-30). This chapter will focus on “practical induction”, 
that is, the kind of induction that allows us to grasp the starting-point of 
practical reasoning. 

  The discussion of Aristotle’s theory of “practical induction” usually begins 
with stating that it is an analogue of “theoretical induction”. Since Aristotle 
has explicitly elaborated on the latter but not so much on the former, the 
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theoretical/practical analogue is usually introduced as a strategy to shed 
light on the nature of practical induction. Following this practice, let’s first 
look at the different stages of the induction process as it is understood 
along the lines of theoretical induction. Using the usual example of coming 
to learn the definition of mathematical entities such as a triangle, the stages 
can be described as follows:

1) One perceives many instances of triangles many times. 

2) Such perceptions are preserved in memory. (APo. 100a3; Meta. 
980a28-9)

3) Many memories give rise to one experience (100a5-6; Meta. 
980b29-981a1), which contains implicitly a universal (100a6-7), 
responsible for explaining why the particular triangles have the 
properties they do. 

4) One explicitly grasps this explanatory universal, which can then be 
the starting-point for demonstration (100a6-9). 
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    But it is not entirely clear what exactly these stages correspond to in the 
practical case. We will see more about them below.    

   Induction is in essence a process/method that proceeds from the many 
(particulars) to the one (universals, implicit or explicit). One generalises from 
the many examples one is exposed to, detecting some commonalities 
between them, thereby forming a universal notion supposedly present in 
one’s perception of these particulars. As such, then, the product of this 
induction process should meet the following criteria. a) It should be 
sufficiently simple, in the sense that its content does not repeat every detail 
of the particulars. For otherwise there is no need for induction in the first 
 As summarised and demarcated in Moss (2012, 153). 74
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place. b) It should be “well-grounded”, in that there should be some sort of 
intimate connection or continuity between the basis and the product of the 
induction. This captures the idea that the product of induction should be 
somehow answerable to the data perceived. c) The basis of induction 
should be sufficiently wide. For there is no point in forming a universal 
notion if one encounters only a few samples. The three conditions jointly 
capture how the universal notion generalised from the process is 
explanatory of the perceived particulars: there is a sufficiently simple 
definition answerable to the sufficiently widely collected data or samples. 
As such, the universal notion demarcates the scope of the relevant object 
(i.e. what falls under this definition). 

   Aristotle’s own characterisation of practical induction is very compressed:

Also, understanding (nous) is concerned with things that come last 
in both directions. For concerning the primary terms and the things 
that come last, there is understanding but no reason (logos)—that is 
to say, on the one hand, in the case of demonstrations, 
understanding is of the unchanging and primary terms; on the other 
hand, in the case of those that are practical, it is of the last thing and 
the one that admits of being otherwise and the other [i.e. the minor] 
premise, since these are starting-points of the end, as it is from 
particulars that universals come. So of these we must have 
perception, and this is understanding. (1143a36-b6)

   In the rest of NE VI. nous is restricted to theoretical use: a kind of intuitive 
and intellectual grasp of the necessary first principles (the “unchanging and 
primary terms”). 
 of 83 147
3.2 The Socratic conception  
  We can begin by explaining the debate concerning the last stage of 
practical induction, which concerns the product or the end-point of the 
induction process. Some argued that practical induction is the process 
through which the agent forms his general conception of what is required in 
a given set of situations . Some argued that it is rather the process through 75
which the agent forms evaluative appearances and uses them to guide his 
practical reasoning. Let’s begin with the first conception: for reasons that 
will become clear later, let’s call it the “Socratic conception”. My elaboration 
will be centred around 1143a36-b6 quoted above.

3.2.1 Sorabji’s initial construction  
  Suppose it is courage that we care about. According to Sorabji’s 
interpretation, the process of induction leads to a general conception of 
what courage requires of one. Sorabji suggested that judgements of the 
form “this is what courage requires of us right now” can be the particular 
starting-point from which the induction process begins . These particular 76
judgments supply “the initial materials for building up a conception of what 
is required not merely now but in general”.  Presumably, the idea is that the 77
agent proceeds from particular judgments to a collection of these 
judgments, (all of the form “this is what courage requires of us right now”, 
each responding to different situations) then eventually he will have a 
 See, e.g. Reeve (1992), Dahl (1984). 75
 Sorabji (1980, 215). 76
 Sorabji (1980, 215). See also Dahl (1984, 44). 77
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determinate conception of what courage in general requires of him. This is 
how Sorabji interprets “these are starting-points of the end, as it is from 
particulars that universals come” (1143b5). Presumably, “these” refers to 
the objects of nous, in this case, the particular judgments. According to this 
interpretation, then, the “starting-points of the end” correspond to the 
“particulars” and the “end” itself corresponds to the “universals” (a general 
conception).

   Now, Sorabji suggested that the judgment “this is what courage requires 
of us now” can be understood as (a) “the last thing” (1143b2) because “the 
particular is the last thing you arrive at, if you work your way down from the 
universal”, when deciding what you ought to do. Relatedly, Sorabji argued 
that the judgment “this [say, ambush] is what courage requires of us now” 
can serve as (b) the “(last) minor premise” (1143b3) because one’s 
knowledge of what best promotes or realises the end (being courageous) 
needs to be “controlled by an intuitive perception of what courage 
requires” , and because it is the minor premise that concerns perception. 78
Point (a) and point (b) characterise the object of nous, and as such it is also 
the last minor premise of deliberation. So the theory of nous covers both 
the materials for induction and the last step of deliberation, despite the fact 
that inductive reasoning and deliberative reasoning are distinct in kind. 

 Sorabji (1980, 209). 78
 of 85 147
   In fact, one may extend the theory to cover the ultimate goal, eudaimonia. 
Reeve, for instance, argued that eventually it is the intuition about this end, 
the unconditional end, that practical induction will lead us to.   
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  (In the next chapter, we will see how the Socratic conception can be 
extended to support a theory of practical deliberation. Maybe practical 
reasoning is analogous to the practice of medicine: just as the doctor 
diagnoses and decides to give certain particular treatments to different 
cases given his substantial and determinate (and may well be implicit) 
conception of healthiness, the good deliberator perceives and chooses 
based on a substantial and comprehensive conception of the good (Cf. 
Meta. 1032a32-b17; NE 1180b14-1181b10). However, this is not self-
evident; we will see objections in the next chapter)

   But then how exactly do one come to grasp the general conception? 
What happens exactly when one comes to collect particular judgments and 
“extracts” from them the essence of the subject-matter concerned? 

  Now, Sorabji did not explicitly say this, but I think it is reasonable to 
elaborate as follows. I think the picture that emerges, according to this 
Socratic conception, is of someone who always remain self-critical and 
reflective of his own thoughts, decisions and actions (maybe also 
emotions). He values clear-eyedness, sanity, and tries his best to regulate 
his own behaviour based on his latest conclusion. For example, with regard 
to courage specifically, initially he may think that it means fearless 
whatsoever. But then he may realise that there are things that one ought to 
 Sorabji (1980, 206-214). See also Reeve (1992, 86): “Now nous is of the first 79
principle or unconditional end, eudaimonia” and Reeve (2013, 6-17). 
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fear, and he should “fear them as he ought and as reason directs”, and the 
brave man “will face them for the sake of what is noble” (1115b7-13; ). For 
otherwise he would be mad or insensible or rash (1115b24-8). So some 
behaviours are ruled out as instances of courage. Then, he may further 
notice that true courage requires aiming at the right things (1116a13-15). 
So, some aims or motives are ruled out as instances of courage. Then, he 
may also distinguish true courage from 1) “political courage”, which aims at 
honour (1116a16-1116b3), as opposed to excellence, 2) confidence 
grounded in sufficient experience (in dealing with similar situations) 
(1116b4-1116b23), 3) dangerous acts driven by pain or passions 
(1116b24-1117a9), 4) acts based on over-optimistic expectation, 
(1117a10-1117a21) and 5) seemingly fearless acts based on ignorance 
(1117a22-1117a26). 

   All these require careful distinctions and being able to discern specific 
conditions for appropriate actions. The one who is gradually learning all 
these through practical induction and eventually grasps the essence of true 
courage is the one who conducts deep reflective thinking with respect to 
his own practical life. One reason to hold this view is that since virtues are 
“prohairetic states” (literally, “a state issuing in decisions”), and since 
decisions are the results of rational deliberation, our virtuous responses 
must be warranted by our reflective thinking . This makes the Aristotelian 80
agent rather like Socrates: “this even happens to be a very great good for a 
 One implication, then, is that virtues according to this interpretation are in part an 80
intellectual state. See, e.g. Lorenz (2009), Irwin (1975, 576). 
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human being—to make speeches every day about virtue and the other 
things about which you hear me conversing and examining both myself and 
others— and that the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being” 
(Apology, 37e6-38a7).

3.2.2 How (Socratic) inductive reasoning is a long-term process 
    Now let’s return to 1143a35-b6 (“understanding is concerned with things 
that come last in both directions…”). But I want to start by looking a few 
lines below:

while nobody seems wise by nature, people do seem to have 
consideration, comprehension, and understanding by nature. An 
indication of this is that we also think these states correspond to 
the stages of life and that a particular stage brings understanding 
and consideration, as if nature were the cause. (1143b6-10).

   We will discuss “consideration” and “comprehension” in the next chapter. 
I would like to focus on the reference to the “stages of life” here. It suggests 
that the process can extend over quite a long period of time: the process of 
induction is temporally-extended. In other words, the Socratic conception 
of practical induction is not focusing on a particular snapshot of inductive 
reasoning. It tells a story about one’s constant, most naturally long-term, 
reflection about certain essence. Occasionally, one may arrive at a 
conclusion about the essence of certain subject-matter while one is giving a 
particular judgment here and now (it’ll be something like “ah, yes, this is it, I 
get it now”). Or, conversely, one can realise that this particular judgment is 
the right judgment to make here and now while one is reflecting on one’s 
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conception of the subject-matter. So tokens of inductive reasoning about 
essence and tokens of deliberative reasoning that aims at giving judgments, 
though distinct in kind, can overlap at the level of causal occurrence. 

   There will be cases where one knows the right judgments but failed to 
examine one’s own ideas in the Socratic style. There will also be cases 
where one conducts Socratic inductive reasoning thoroughly but fails to 
keep up with all the details of the particular situation. Additionally, one may 
realise the significance of some particular judgments only in retrospect. So, 
one’s judgments here and now can be helpful for one to understand the 
essence of the subject-matter in the future, even it does not seem so at the 
first sight. Finally, it is also possible that if one’s judgment is qualified by a 
clause stating that this is an exceptional case, valid only as a one-time deal, 
then this judgment stated as such is not likely to be included in the general 
conception (but the conception may state the relevant non-ideal condition). 
So, not every particular judgments will end up being reproduced in the 
product of induction; the inductive generalisation is essentially selective. 

3.3 Moss’ alternative account 
   Now I proceed to an alternative conception of practical induction. Let me 
begin with explaining how it conceives of the end-point of induction: an 
evaluative appearance of something pleasurable/good or painful/bad. Since 
Jessica Moss gave the most systematic and complete account of this 
position, I will focus on her discussion.
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3.3.1 Evaluative appearances  
    Let’s first look at the nature of the goal:

But before the process [of deliberation] begins there will be the that-
on-account-of-which, and this is the that-for-the-sake-of-which, for 
example wealth or pleasure or any other such thing which happens 
to be the that-for-the-sake-of- which......And the cause [of this kind 
of error i.e. error about the end] is the pleasant and the painful. For 
things are so constituted that the pleasant appears good to the soul, 
and the more pleasant better, and the painful bad and the more 
painful worse. (EE1227a13-b1; trans. Moss)

   Naturally, we are attracted to pleasurable things and we tend to avoid 
painful things. Aristotle goes on to claim that finding the wrong things 
pleasurable or painful causes us to endorse corrupted ends: to value the 
wrong things. Moss also argued that the contents of both belief and wish 
(boulesis), the distinctively Human desire as Aristotle conceived of it, are 
determined by evaluative phantasia , i.e. evaluative appearances about 81
what is pleasurable/good and what is painful/bad . Moss emphasised that 82
Aristotle was more a psychological hedonist than one might think . (In the 83
next chapter, we will see that the “pleasure” and the “painful” involved here 
have a moral connotation: pride and shame respectively.) The adoption of 
 Standardly translated as “imagination”, but literally as “appearance-awareness” or 81
“being-appeared-to” (Moss, 2012, xii). 
 More precisely, Moss argued that beliefs are assent to appearances and wishes are 82
based on beliefs; that is, wishes track appearances indirectly via beliefs. This leaves 
room for the akratic  (who acquires the right beliefs elsewhere through, say, others’ 
testimony,  thus also - since wishes are based on beliefs - the right wishes, but do not 
have the right appearances) and the enkratic (who shares the same states-of-mind but 
whose beliefs are motivationally efficient). See (2012, ch.8.5). 
 Moss (2012, 141).83
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ends (the that-on-account-of-which/for-the-sake-of-which), then, has a 
standard of correctness different from the correctness related to 
deliberation: it is rather because something appears pleasant or painful, not 
because it is the most deliberated option (or the option that is most 
reasonable according to deliberation), that one is inclined to embrace or 
reject a certain end. One acquires such ends even before the deliberation 
process. This is very different from the view according to which the 
induction process leads to intuition of essences. 

  The emphasis on evaluative appearances is further confirmed by the 
intimate relation between evaluative perception and character:

Should we say that what is wished for without qualification is the 
good, but for each person the apparent good? For the virtuous 
person, then, what is wished will be what really is [good/to-be-
wished-for], while for the base person what is wished for is some 
chance thing . . . For the virtuous person discerns each thing rightly, 
and in each case the truth appears to him. (NE 1113a23-31; trans. 
Moss)

  But how does this involve a process of induction? Moss’ view can be 
summarised in the following passage: “just as induction yields, through 
perception and phantasia, an ability to recognize certain shapes as triangles 
(where that does not yet include an explicit grasp of the feature one is 
recognizing), so habituation yields, through pleasurable perception 
reproduced by phantasia, an ability to recognize virtuous activity as to-be-
pursued (with the same caveat). Someone who has acquired this ability is 
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someone to whom virtuous activity now appears good, i.e. someone 
subject to a general appearance of virtuous activity as good.”  The product 84
of induction, then, can be expressed by the form “x is good (to-be-
pursued)”. Correspondingly, as it is quite natural to think, the starting-point 
of induction takes the form “this x is good (to-be-pursued) here and now”. 
(Similar to the Socratic conception, there can also be appearances of 
middle-level generality, e.g. “this courageous act is good here and now (to-
be-pursued)”. 

   This process of forming appearances fits our initial analyses of induction. 
Through repeated pleasurable exposure to x, some aspects of x are 
recognised and preserved, which will eventually lead to an implicit yet 
determinate grasp of the goodness of x. Arguably, this representation of the 
value of x is selective, and thus will not include every detail of x, or every 
aspect through which x can be presented. In this way, the appearances 
formed are a generalisation from the (first-order) perception. 

   Relatedly, these first-order perceptions are what the product of induction 
must be answerable to . She had argued, quite forcefully I think, that the 85
the formation of the general evaluative appearances involves the exercise of 
one’s phantasia: phantasia preserves and reproduces not just the narrowly 
representational content of the perceptions, but also their affective and 
motivational dimensions. The general appearance of, say, the taste of a 
delicious cake does not just give one the description that the cake is 
 Moss (2012, 221). See also Burnet (1900, 64-68), Achtenberg (2002). 84
 Moss calls this “Practical Empiricism” (2002, 151-2). 85
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delicious, but invites one to re-experience the pleasure of enjoying the 
delicious flavour of the cake. Generally, Aristotle said with regard to 
passions and phantasia that: “people are either pleased in remembering as 
they experienced, or in expecting as they will experience. So that it’s 
necessary for all such pleasure to arise from perceptibles” (Phy. 
247a7-14) . 
86
   Finally, it is also quite natural to suppose that the appearances formed are 
based on exposure to a sufficient amount of samples. These may involve 
expectation of possible cases: one feel pity “whenever one is so disposed 
as to remember such things happening to himself or to one of his loved 
ones, or to expect such things to occur to him or to one of his loved 
ones” (1386a1-3). Sometimes it may even involve visual postulation of 
fictional scenarios: “as Cydias said to the people in the debate about the 
allotment of land in Samos; for he thought the Athenians should suppose he 
Greeks standing around them in a circle, actually seeing and not only later 
hearing about what they might vote” (1384b32-35).

   So, the nature of “goal” is “being pleasurable”. But Moss further argued 
that the “function” of having ends is to let us deliberate with a view to settle 
on a practicable decision: 

[D]ecision is not present in the other animals nor in people of every 
age nor of every state. For neither is deliberation [present], nor 
supposition of the that-on-account-of-which, but nothing prevents 
many from being able to opine whether something is to be done or 
 Moss (2012, 79-81). 86
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n o t t o b e d o n e , w h i l e n o t y e t d o i n g t h i s t h ro u g h 
reasoning ......Wherefore those for whom no goal is laid down are 
not able to deliberate (EE 1226b20-30; trans. Moss)

  To decide to do something, rather than just opining whether to do that 
thing, one has to have an end in view and hold on to it while conducting 
mean-ends reasoning.  Moss meant to say inductive reasoning ends at 87
deliberating how to achieve what one finds pleasurable (and avoid what one 
finds painful). 

  So according to Moss’ account, the “starting-point” that practical 
induction enables us to grasp is evaluative appearances, not general 
conceptions. Indeed, Moss had explicitly rejected the idea that (in the 
ethical realm) we need anything as intellectualised as an intuition of the 
essences of virtues and/or eudaimonia.  
88
3.3.2 Nous (1143a36-b6 again) 
  Let’s turn to 1143a36-b6 again and see how Moss’ account would 
interpret the passage. Let’s start by the most enigmatic phrase: “these are 
starting-points of the end, as it is from particulars that universals come”. We 
have seen how the previous interpretation reads this sentence: the 
 This echoes what I wrote at the end of section 1.1.4: the starting-point of practical 87
reasoning is indemonstrable in the sense that “one cannot both deliberate about 
whether to adopt a certain end and adopt it as an end that effectively guides one’s 
reasoning and action. For any end to be grasped as an end, that is, for that end to be 
the purpose, the “that-for-the-sake-of-which”, or that which is expressed in one’s 
chosen action, one has to stop the series of asking for its further rationale”, and it is 
virtues rather than reason that enable one to stop this series. Moss’ account gives us 
a theory as to how virtues are supposed to do this.
 See Moss (2012, 184-5, 189, 227-8).88
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particular judgement “this is what courage requires of us now” serves as 
the material, and in this sense the starting-point, of the induction process, 
through which our general (universal) conception of courage is formed. 
Moss explicitly argued against this reading. According to her reading, the 
particulars are not the starting-point for our conception of ends, but the 
starting-point for the attainment of ends, that is, they are the starting-point 
of action . Correspondingly, “from particulars that universals come” may 89
mean something like “the realisation of universals begins by getting 
particularised”. The induction process eventually contributes to wise 
decisions, one might suppose, as nous helps to calibrate one’s given ends 
by finding the appropriate evaluative interpretation of the situation; 
presumably, this is one way how one’s ends can guide one’s reasoning.

  Consequently, the relation between the material of induction (evaluative 
perceptions) and its product (general evaluative appearances) will be much 
closer. I want to suggest that, in Moss’ account, the product of induction 
has to be sufficiently vivid, concrete and fine-grained. We have seen one 
instance of this already: evaluative appearances have to preserve the 
affective and motivational power (not just the narrow representational 
content) of perceptions, and that almost always means having concrete and 
determinate appearances. 

    Recall, as we have seen in section 3.2.1, the materials of induction are a) 
“the last thing” and b) the minor premise. Let’s first look at point (a): how are 
 Moss (2012, 190).89
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the particular perceptions so conceived (“this x is good (to-be-pursued) 
here and now”) “the last thing”, i.e. immediately practicable? In Moss’ 
account, this brings us to the theory of locomotion : “phantasiai and 90
perceptions and thoughts alter the parts [thereby initiating the changes 
which lead to locomotion]. For perceptions are at once a kind of alteration, 
and phantasia and thinking have the power of the actual things” (MA 
701b16-19); The intuitive idea is that the exercise of phantasiai (and 
perceptions and thoughts) has a physiological aspect: anger, say, is 
accompanied by the boiling of the blood around the heart (403a31-b1). This 
is true not just of emotions but also of more intellectual thought process: 
“For in a certain way the thought form of the pleasant or frightening is like 
the actual thing itself. That is why we shudder and are frightened just 
thinking of something…(but we don’t notice this happening concerning very 
small things)” (b19-35). Supposedly, the indexical minor premise will trigger 
the motivating/physiological aspect of one’s deliberation. To have the 
evaluative appearances answerable to these evaluation perceptions, then, 
means we have to keep our evaluative appearances sufficiently vivid. 
Aristotle’s analysis of mourn makes this clear: mourning consists in “seeing 
[the departed] and what he used to do and what he was like” (1370b26-28). 
It is not enough just to see that “x is good”, then, one has to be able to 
account of the goodness of x in vivid terms: what it is like to have/achieve/
experience x, what image it is associated with, which aspect of it you find 
most relatable, and so on.

 See esp. Moss (2012, ch.2.1). 90
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  Second, point (b): the materials of induction (viz. evaluative perceptions) 
are also the minor premise. This can be understood as: rational agents 
deliberate through these perceptions. At this point it is quite natural to 
appeal to the theoretical/practical analogue again. Aristotle gave the 
example of geometrical reasoning. Diagrams are essential constituents of 
geometrical reasoning, in the sense that it is through diagrams that we can 
represent to ourselves different variations and combinations of the purely 
abstract entities. 
91
   Analogously, in the practical case, Aristotle claimed that “to the thinking 
soul, phantasmata [images] serve just like aistheˆmata [content of 
perception], and whenever it states or denies good or bad, it avoids or 
pursues. This is why the soul never thinks without a phantasma” (de An. 
431a14-17).  But what is the practical analogue of geometrical shapes? 92
Let’s continue reading: “sometimes it [the relevant faculty] calculates and 
deliberates about future things in relation to present things, using the 
phantasmata and thoughts in the soul, as if seeing” (431b8-9). Presumably, 
argued Moss, the idea is that in deliberation we envisage or otherwise 
determinately characterise (“as if seeing”) what it is like should certain 
state-of-affairs obtain . Just as geometrical reasoning is inseparable from 93
 Aristotle claimed that “whenever one contemplates, one necessarily at the same 91
time contemplates by means of phantasmata” (de An. 432a3-10); “It is not possible to 
think without a phantasma. For the same affection occurs in thinking as in drawing 
diagrams…it is clear that the recognition of these objects is through the primary 
faculty of perception” (Mem. 449b31-450a13).
 The reference to avoid and pursue should be familiar given what we have just seen 92
about how appearances can cause, through triggering the physiological aspects of the 
relevant faculty of mind, locomotion.
 Moss (2012, ch.6.3, esp. 145-146). 93
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drawing and inspecting diagrams, practical reasoning is inseparable from 
envisaging possible objects of decisions. To have the product of induction 
answerable to the last minor premise, then, means one’s evaluative 
appearances should be sufficiently concrete: it is not enough just to see “x 
is good”, one has to be able to describe the goodness of x in concrete 
terms: in what ways, in which aspects, to whom, etc.

   This is not all. Elsewhere Aristotle hinted that one’s deliberation is not only 
about envisaging future state-of-affairs. In NE VI. 1142b25-30, Aristotle 
compared practical deliberation to solving geometric problems again: 
“...practical wisdom concerns the last thing, of which there is not scientific 
knowledge but rather perception - not the perception of the special objects 
but like the sort by which we perceive that the last thing among 
mathematical objects is a triangle, since there too will come a stopping-
point”. What is this “stopping-point” in practical reasoning? Natali (2014) 
further introduces Meta.ix.9, which provides an illustration of the 
geometrical procedure: “It is by actualisation that geometrical relations are 
discovered: for it is by dividing the given figures that people discover 
them” (1051a21-23) .  
94
  The geometer tries to find a solution by drawing and transforming the 
diagram: by adding lines, decomposing the figure, etc., he inspects the 
figure until the solution simply manifests itself, or until he can simply “see” 
the solution (the “stopping-point”). Similarly, the deliberator approaches the 
 Natali (2014, 193).94
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situation by describing it in many different ways, configuring it in terms of 
many different evaluative appearances, interpreting it through many 
different evaluative categories, etc. One might at first suppose that it is an 
issue/debate concerning the interests of different social groups, then one 
might realise that it involves different political views, then power structure 
suggests itself, then it might turn out to be a matter also of moral principles. 
By navigating through these different analyses, one tries to make sense of 
the situation through a variety of different “middle/intermediate-terms”, until 
eventually the “best” solution shall suggest itself, or one shall eventually be 
able to simply “see” the way out. 

   Nous, then, prepares one to be maximally in tune with the delicate and 
fine-grained situation . To have the product of induction answerable to the 95
last minor premise, then, means that one’s evaluative appearances have to 
be sufficiently fine-grained: it is not enough just to see “x is good”, one has 
to be able to articulate the goodness of x as it is presented in a specific 
context. Only then can one approaches the situation using these 
appearances, just as the geometer inspects a figure with different 
geometrical tools. 

 Moss came closest to this when she argued that phronesis is supposed to detect 95
the mean, which will serve as the minor premise of a particular syllogism, and that this 
is also equivalent to deliberate excellently about “things toward ends” (2012, 195). For 
failing to deliberate well about “things toward ends” amounts to failing to detect the 
best way to realise one’s otherwise virtuous goals in a particular situation. She even 
called nous the “intellectual quasi-perception of particulars”, and in this sense agreed 
with McDowell and Wiggins that the practical intellect is responsible for specifying the 
“constituents”, as opposed to instrumental means, of one’s ends (McDowell 2002, 
Essay 2; Wiggins, 2002, Essay 6). That is, the excellent deliberation helps to specify 
what realising certain ends amounts to in a particular situation (196-7). But Moss did 
not introduce Meta. ix.9 and did not illustrate nous with the analogy of geometrical 
reasoning.
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   This rules out those evaluative appearances that are too remote, abstract 
and unspecific, e.g. those vague fantasies about what’s worth-pursuing one 
heard from others’ testimonies, films, unrealistic imagination, etc. One’s 
general evaluative appearance as to what is desirable (thus to-be-pursued) 
and undesirable (thus to-be-avoided) should be maximally coherent with 
one’s first-order evaluative perceptions. For ultimately the basis of induction 
is evaluative perceptions. Further, as Aristotle believed that repeated and 
memorised perceptions produce “experience” (Meta. 980b26-29), one 
might even say one’s evaluative appearances should be coherent with one’s 
evaluative experience. In general, then, practical induction explains why 
habituation does have character-shaping power : a vivid, concrete, and 96
fine-grained major premise influences many aspects of one’s personality.

  The general picture we get out of these, I think, is the following. The 
Aristotelian agent cannot be characterised as someone who inquires into 
the essences of different subject-matter in the practical realm. Rather, the 
Aristotelian agent as Moss’ alternative interpretation has it would be 
someone who is most truthful to his heart (in the sense that his evaluative 
thoughts are maximally coherent with his evaluative experience)  and most 97
 Unlike the Socratic conception, where experience is useful mainly for coming up 96
with a finer-grained articulation of the minor premise, in Moss’ account, experience 
also shapes our character (therefore the articulation of the major premise, given the 
correlation between evaluative appearance and character.
 As practical-inductive reasoning extends beyond the period of early education, 97
using practical induction to explain the character-shaping effects of habituation also 
means claiming that habituation is a long-term process that extends beyond the 
period of early education. The idea that habituation is a long-term (maybe even life-
long) process is itself reasonable and interesting, but I will have to leave it at that.
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sensitive to the actual situation he is in (in the sense that he reads the 
situation in its full delicacy and fine-grainedness).

3.3.3 Recap  
   One may summarise the differences between the two positions using the 
following four parameters. 1) The end-point of the induction process. One 
thinks that it is the intuition of essence (of the relevant subject-matter), 
another thinks it is the deliberation-guiding evaluative appearances. 2) The 
object of nous. The Socratic conception claims it is the first principles - true 
essence of whatever it is that is grasped by induction. Moss’ account 
claims it is evaluative perceptions. Through the analogy with geometrical 
reasoning, I interpreted it as one’s attempt to interpret the situation. 3) The 
exact nature of those particulars from which the induction process begins. 
The Socratic conception identifies these particulars as the particular 
judgments, expressed by the form “this is what certain virtue requires of us 
now”, and treats them as the materials from which one’s general 
conception is formed. Moss’ account identifies particular evaluative 
perceptions as the relevant particulars, expressed by the form “x is good 
(to-be-pursued)” (or “x is bad (to-be-avoided)”), and treats them (more 
precisely, the evaluative experiences one gains out of them) as the building 
blocks of one’s character.

   Quite roughly, if it helps to compare the two accounts at a very general 
level, one might say the differences are epitomised in the difference 
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between emphasising reflectiveness and emphasising truthfulness as the 
ideal character. 

3.4 Habituation and practical induction 
   At this point we may explain the relation between the first chapter and the 
current one. In the first chapter, I discussed the dialectic between the 
critical practice model of habituation and the thesis that habituation is 
immersion. How do the two positions there relate to the Socratic 
conception and Moss’ account respectively? 

   As I said at the beginning of this chapter, the theory of practical induction 
explains one’s grasp of the starting-point of practical reasoning. The 
discussion of habituation, on the other hand, is embedded in the debate 
about whether virtue is taught, innate, or acquired by habits. Supposedly, 
habituation also explains why we have the ends we do. As one’s ends 
serve, in virtue of being the major premise, as the starting-point of one’s 
practical inference, and as Aristotle explicitly said one’s ends are fixed by 
one’s virtue (NE 1151a17-19; 1144a29-36; 1113a25–b2; 1104b32–4), the 
theory of practical induction can be translated into a theory of habituation 
(which is a theory of virtue-inculcation). Indeed, this is how Moss locates 
the theory of practical induction in Aristotle’s universe . At the first sight, 98
then, the two sets of positions discussed in the two chapters respectively 
map onto each other. The Socratic conception of practical induction fits 
 Moss (2012, ch.8). 98
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fairly well with the critical practice model of habituation, and Moss’ account 
seems to be a further elaboration of the “habituation-as-immersion” thesis. 

  With regard to the former set, one might say: the ideal model that one 
identifies as the targeted goal for critical activities should be accepted as a 
goal only if it is warranted by one’s intuition of the relevant essences. That 
is, regarding the ideal model with reference to which one regulates and 
measures one’s efforts, one should ask whether the model itself is 
supported by one’s best understanding (based on one’s degree of reflective 
thinking conducted so far) of the relevant conception in question. The 
specification of the content of the model itself can be governed and shaped 
by one’s latest conclusion of the induction process . Suppose one’s ideal 99
concerns acting courageously. Then one regulates one’s actions in the hope 
that one can approximate this goal and measures one’s successes and 
failures with reference to this ideal. It is very natural to suppose that the 
kind of reflection one conducts throughout the induction process (forming 
general conception of courage based on particular judgments of courage) 
should somehow inform and enlighten one’s specification of the goal of 
acting courageously. One’s ideal model of courage and thereby how one 
regulates one’s behaviour will differ, for instance, if one draws the finer-
grained distinction between the five types of courage Aristotle discussed in 
NE III.8.   

 Joachim (1951, 210), quoted from Moss (2012, 183, n.66). 99
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   Further, measuring one’s efforts against the informed ideal (as part of 
what “critical practice” requires) can sharpen the focus of one’s particular 
judgments (from which the induction begins). This may be so because 
pinpointing one’s specific weaknesses in approximating the ideal can help 
further articulate the content of the context-sensitive judgment (that “this is 
what a certain virtue requires of me”). Finally, at the level of particulars, the 
fact that one realises “this is what certain virtue requires of me” and one’s 
attempt to assess one’s responses against the ideal model occupy the 
same conceptual space. That is, one evaluates one’s successes and 
failures in approximating the ideal by considering how best one had fulfilled 
the normative demand of the particular judgments; and, conversely, one is 
able to detect what is required here and now because one has the ideal 
model in mind. In these ways, the critical practice model and the Socratic 
conception of practical induction enrich each other.

   With regard to the combination of Moss’ account of practical induction 
and the “habituation-as-immersion” thesis, one might say the following. 
Recall, according to the “habituation-as-immersion” thesis, the process of 
habituation is like the process of picking up one’s native tongue: through 
imitation or implicit behavioural influences, one holistically exposes oneself 
to a cultural setting, and thereby one’s natural states are shaped without 
substantial intervention of the intellect. Moss’ account of practical induction 
seems a perfect way to unpack what exactly happened during the process 
of “immersion". How one’s evaluative experiences serve as the building 
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blocks of one’s character echoes how habituation is supposed to shape our 
evaluation of specific ends and patterns of reasoning (section 1.1.3-1.1.4). 

  Further, I also emphasised that the immersion process need not be 
singular; rather, it can involve a series of holistic episodes. I emphasised 
that the different expressions of virtues in different situations, or even that of 
different virtues, can be related to each other through family resemblances. 
As such, we acquire virtues by acquiring sub-components of each of them 
gradually. I argued that this allows the “habituation-as-immersion” thesis to 
explain how the agent can acquire complex pleasures (such as that of 
accomplishing justice) (section1.2.2). This echoes how the induction 
process took place: through generalising from particular evaluative 
perceptions. 

  What’s more, the fact that virtues can be broken down into their sub-
components invites the thought that “situations” can also be regarded as 
structured compound. It is plausible to suggest that the situations we face 
in our ethical lives consist of different constituent parts, such that we can 
define some structural properties of situations as follows. The complexity of 
situations can be articulated by the varieties of parts that constitute that 
situation. The similarity between situations, therefore one’s familiarity with 
them, can be articulated by the similarity between different parts of different 
situations . Further, the uniqueness of particular situation consists in this: 100
that the parts that constitute such situations cannot be repeated in other 
 This picture is suggested by Nussbaum (1992, 72). 100
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situations, or that the whole combination of the parts that constitutes a 
particular situation can hardly be repeated. Intimate interpersonal relations 
are often like this. One’s relationships with his or her parents, for example, 
are typically built on top of one’s childhood and teenage experiences and 
memories associated with them. These experiences are themselves non-
repeatable and full of such contingent and highly specific elements as a 
particular fight, a particular birthday, and so on . 
101
   This gives us a way to illustrate the exercise of nous. One might say, for 
instance, that gaining familiarity with situations is a way to make sense of 
the situation one is in, as finding similarities is a way to organise one’s 
experiences. This may also be the way how past experiences give us an 
eye of wisdom. One can also say we should always appreciate the 
uniqueness of new situations, despite the fact that they share similarities 
with situations we are already familiar with (or despite the fact that we need 
to make sense of new situations through finding similarities). For otherwise 
we would fail to keep in touch with the constantly changing reality. Further, 
one can say becoming familiar with complex situations is a way to acquire 
practical wisdom. In fact, one may think of how the nous approaches or 
interprets the situation in terms of how it figures out the variety of 
constituent parts of complex situations. Again, this is analogous to 
geometrical reasoning; figuring out how the shape can be decomposed into 
different constituent parts or transformed into different shapes by adding 
lines are ways to discover the geometrical properties of the original figure. 

 Nussbaum (1992, 72), and the works cited in (1992, n.36.)101
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 So the critical practice model does seem to fit with the Socratic 
conception, and the “habituation-as-immersion” thesis does seem to fit 
with Moss’ account. 

Interlude 
  As the two sets of positions in the two chapters fit with each other, the 
debate between the critical practice model and the “habituation as 
immersion” thesis in ch.1 extends to the stalemate between the Socratic 
conception and Moss’ account in this chapter. The philosophical package 
of each side becomes even more complicated, and adjudicating between 
them becomes more difficult. 

  I have been explaining the relation between the first and the current 
chapter. In the next chapter, I will bring in what I found in the second 
chapter into the discussion. This will help me to confront the issue on yet 
another front. In particular, I will pick up some themes I introduced in 
section 2.3.4 (“Extending solidarity”). There, I pointed out that to explore a 
level of solidarity beyond conventional social roles helps the child to further 
understand different purposes of different human activities (since 
community is typically bound by some common purpose). Now the 
connection should be fairly straightforward: the purposes that bind 
communities are also the purposes that one grasps through practical 
induction. I will argue that revealing the communal background of our 
ethical lives helps shed light on a number of issues, including the nature of 
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ethical emotions, the exercise of intellectual skills in practical reasoning, 
and how ethical community should be egalitarian. 

   In effect, I will be arguing, as one can expect from my position in ch.1, in 
favour of Moss’ account. By emphasising on the significance of the ethical 
community, I will argue for a rather non-intellectualised theory of practical 
reasoning. 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Chapter 4  Deliberation and the ethical 
community  
Introduction 
  This chapter explores practical deliberation and how “ethical community” 
plays an indispensable role in practical deliberation. I will begin by pushing 
the dialectic between Moss’ account and the Socratic conception one step 
forward. I will discuss how Moss’ account can try to accommodate the 
main points of its opponent without compromising its own contentions 
(section 4.1). Then I will proceed to outline the significance of friendship and 
emotion in shaping our goals (section 4.2). After a short section on 
intellectual skills (section 4.3), I will explain how the ethical community is 
indispensable in an Aristotelian theory of emotions and theory of practical 
deliberation (section 4.4). I end by revisiting the notion of “solidarity” I 
introduced in ch.2; I will further elaborate on the ethical qualities involved in 
an egalitarian ethical community. 

4.1 Deliberation 
   Let’s start by briefly summarising Moss’ account. As we have seen, in her 
account, the induction is based on one’s evaluative perception. And since 
the theory of induction is meant to explain our grasp of the starting-point of 
syllogistic reasoning, it follows that (according Moss) it is through the 
evaluative perceptions (and phantasia) that one grasps the starting-point. 
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And this is done through sensing/feeling what is pleasurable and what is 
painful to the agent; Moss argued that Aristotle was more a psychological 
hedonist than we might think. As we have also seen, in Moss’ account the 
induction process ends by having the agent explicitly using his goals 
(formed through perception and phantasia) to guide his reasoning and 
actions. In short, then, having instilled the sense of what is worth-pursuing 
and what is not, the world appears to one differently (Cf. NE 1113a23-31), 
and it is through explicitly articulating and representing to oneself these 
evaluative appearances that one reasons and decides “x is to-be-pursued”. 

  Now, since the “starting-point” of deliberation is also one’s ends, and 
since in Moss’ account the final stage of induction consists in exercising 
one’s practical rationality (to conduct means-ends reasoning), the debate 
about the theory of practical induction can be easily extended to the debate 
about whether Aristotle was a Humean: whether, in Aristotle’s account, the 
practical intellect can deliberate about the ends. For if the ends are 
determined through induction based on evaluative perceptions, (and 
evaluative perceptions involve only the exercise of the non-rational soul) 
then ceteris paribus the practical intellect does not have much contribution 
in fixing the contents of ends. Conversely, if, according to the Socratic 
conception, we are supposed to grasp the essence of certain human goods 
or virtues through induction, then maybe we can use this conception as a 
justification for our choice of ends. We do, then, reason about what ends to 
adopt. So, in an attempt to push the dialectic forward, we may proceed to 
the corresponding theory of practical deliberation. Due to limited space, 
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however, I will not address all the positions involved in the debate between 
the Humean and the Anti-Humean. Rather, my discussion will be centred 
around Moss’ account and what I found about the ethical community in ch.
2.

4.1.1 Reasoning does not establish ends 
  In discussing the function of phronesis, Moss argued how some of the 
passages usually cited as Anti-Humean (i.e. that one’s ends are determined 
by one’s intellect) actually only show how the intellect is responsible merely 
for deliberating the “things toward ends”. In effect, she illustrated, quite 
compellingly I think, the differences between “having an end to guide one’s 
deliberation” and “intellectually grasping the possible implementation of 
ends”. Let me briefly explain the differences, for they will point to a way 
how Moss’ account can accommodate the Socratic conception of practical 
induction. 

  In NE 1180b8-26, Aristotle argued that although particularised treatment 
and education have the advantage of providing a more exact or tailor-made 
supervision, preferably it is the agent (craftsman, doctor, trainer, educator) 
with knowledge also of the universal that can fulfil the task better. An Anti-
Humean, therefore, may infer that the phronimos must have knowledge of 
the universals and this amounts to having his practical intellect determine 
the ends, i.e. what should or should not be pursued, according to some 
laws or general policies. 

  However, argued Moss, “legislative science” here need not refer to laws 
that prescribe ends. Knowledge of the universals are not “ends” - that is, 
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goals that tell us what certain courses of actions or plans are for. For 
instance, while “laws must prescribe their [the young] nurture and 
practices”, the purpose of doing so, namely to prepare the young to be 
virtuous, is fixed before such laws are prescribed. The laws are merely 
general institutional policies that implement this end. These policies can be 
counted as “things toward ends”. Relatedly, although Aristotle did 
characterised political science as being concerned with the highest human 
good, this means only that political science aims at promoting this good, 
not that it determines what it is. Of course, politicians must have the right 
conception of the human good and must begin by stating clearly what it is 
(NE 1094a22-25). In general, on might say, political science contributes to 
policy-making by explicitly stating and clarifying clearly the contents of the 
right conception. But this does not mean it is political science that 
determines the correct conception; rather, the contents are given by one’s 
virtues and this makes virtues of character a necessary condition of political 
science (NE 1095b4-6) . The ruler cannot rule well without temperance 102
and justice (Pol. 1259b37). 

   So Moss concluded: “To say that phronesis is concerned with universals 
as well as particulars, then, is simply to say that deliberation involves 
 Wiggins and McDowell’s famous proposal according to which the practical intellect 102
can specify the “constituents of ends”, as opposed to purely instrumental means, can 
be treated similarly. What they regarded as “constituents of ends” can be seen as 
“things towards ends” in Moss’ account. The upshot is that one can accept their 
proposal without drawing the conclusion that therefore the practical intellect can 
determine the ends. The practical intellect is making explicit what is already fixed 
implicitly by evaluative appearances (see below). See n.96 and the citation there.
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universal claims as well as particular ones” . That phronesis must involve 103
universals, therefore, does not imply deliberation can be about ends . 
104
  Now, to go back to the Socratic conception of practical induction, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the general conception such induction 
process establishes is similar or at least comparable to the laws or policies 
just mentioned. For one thing, if the general conception comes from a 
collection of immediately practicable judgments, then there is no surprise 
that, like the universals in craft production, it is useful mainly as law-like 
generalisation of particular judgments. The general conception therefore 
belongs to “things toward ends” rather than the ends themselves. One has 
to first care about, say, being courageous, then one makes those particular 
evaluative judgements and forms the general conception of what courage 
may require of one.  The ends provide the raison d’être for the “things 105
toward ends”: laws, policies, general conceptions.

   If that’s the case, then this is how Moss’ account can accommodate the 
Socratic conception of practical induction. Having first instilled virtuous (or, 
for that matter, vicious) dispositions as to what is and what is not worth 
 Moss (2012, 186). 103
 It is in this light that one should read the remark “the doctor does not heal man 104
except incidentally, but rather Callias or Socrates or someone else . . . (Met. 
981a18-19).” While the merely experienced recognises only particular patterns for 
individuals, the craftsman with knowledge of universals knows that “[this cure] 
benefited all people of this sort, divided off into one type, when ill with this 
disease” (981a7-12). The knowledge of universals here are useful as what best 
categorise the particular patterns, or as law-like generalisation of particular cases, 
rather than as what prescribe the ends. 
 Admittedly, one will have some understanding as to what it is that one is caring 105
about, but given Moss’ account of practical induction, such understanding may just 
consist in non-rational evaluative cognition, i.e. evaluative perceptions and 
appearances. 
 of 113 147
pursuing, and thus what appears pleasurable and painful, the agent can 
then entertain the general conceptions established through particular 
judgments and see how they may best promote the given ends. This seems 
to fit with a point Moss made clear in a later article. Exchanging “ends” with 
“values” (as a translation of telos and skopos), Moss gave one more 
motivation for claiming that one’s ends (values) are determined by the non-
rational soul: these “are not the sort of thing you can reason yourself into 
having” . This is particularly true when it comes to the fundamental value 106
commitments, i.e. those commitments that define one’s moral character 
(see section 1.1.2). For they have complicated roles to play in our practical 
lives; they are the nexus that connect dispositions to feel, act, choose, and 
reason. As such, they can come only through habituation, long-term 
practices, exposure to the right kind of circumstances - in short, a proper 
upbringing.

   This is confirmed by a close reading of NE 1103a5-8, where Aristotle drew 
the distinction between virtues of character and virtues of the intellect. 
These two kinds of virtue are said to correspond with the non-rational part 
and the rational part of the soul respectively. “For in speaking about a man’s 
character we do not say that he is wise or has understanding but that he is 
good-tempered or temperate”. Indeed, it is part of our common sense that 
it is not in virtue of some intellectual excellence that we are praised or 
blamed as good or bad. Rather, as Aristotle later made explicit, virtues are 
whether “we stand well or badly with reference to the passions” (NE 
 Moss (2014, 239). 106
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1105b25). We might as well follow Aristotle’s strategy and take a look at our 
vocabularies. Courageous, compassionate, trustworthy, etc., these are all 
natural candidates for praising others’ character, and they do not usually 
suggest any close connections with such intellectual excellences as 
wittiness, being analytical, and being rigorous. The virtues of character have 
their own standard, which is distinct and different from the standard of the 
virtues of the intellect. This echoes Moss’ idea that one’s ends or values are 
shaped by the non-rational part of the soul. 

  But of course, there is a relevant difference between the intellectually 
equipped and the intellectually impoverished virtuous man. Being analytical 
can give one a clear head, which is particularly important when it comes to 
difficult moral situations. One will then have to (as once explained in section 
3.3.3) approach the different aspects of the situation in different ways, shift 
between different perspectives, and so on. These intellectual efforts 
certainly help one to come up with a, say, just policy that does justice to the 
interests of all the affected parties. Further, being rigorous helps one to 
explain one’s decisions to others, which can be crucial if collective efforts 
are required to solve the problem at hand. As these illustrations suggest, 
excellence in deliberation matters mainly as skills to furnish given virtuous 
ends, including giving the right analysis of the situation or coming up with 
the best policy (more on this below). The ends provide the raison d’être for 
these intellectual efforts. This explains how the general conceptions about 
what ought to do here and now (as required by specific virtues, etc) can be 
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regarded as “things toward ends”, and thus accommodated within Moss’ 
account. 

4.1.2 A comprehensive conception of human value 
  But some doubts remain. For one thing, Aristotle said, “we must enjoin 
every one that has the power to live according to his own choice to set up 
for himself some object for the good life to aim at” (EE 1214b7-11; NE 
1094a18-1094b11). This looks like the intellect can help to identify the 
target one should be aiming and determine what kind of life one should 
pursue. This seems to be a way to “deliberate about ends”, which is 
thought impossible according to Moss’ account. 

   For another, as mentioned in section 3.2, Sorabji believed that eventually 
the inductive process will lead us to an intuition about our ultimate goal, 
namely eudaimonia. As such, then, the general conceptions formed through 
inductive reasoning should contain a hierarchy within themselves, as 
different requirements about what ought to do can be arranged 
hierarchically. Eventually, then, the Socratic conception requires the agent 
to have a comprehensive (all-encompassing) conception with all the 
constituent-conception well-ordered. Now, this comprehensive conception 
helps justify one’s choices and actions by giving the specific ends one is 
deliberating their proper places within a hierarchy of values . Possessing 107
such a comprehensive conception of the human values is a hallmark of 
practical wisdom (NE 1140a25-30). For instance, one may wonder whether 
happiness includes such goods as fortune, good birth and beauty, and to 
 Inglis (2014, sec.3)107
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what extent we are morally allowed to pursue them. In a nutshell, Aristotle’s 
answer is that they should be pursue insofar as they promote the ideal form 
of life (a life of virtuous activities). Although these goods may not be directly 
useful, they nonetheless put one into a more advantageous position in 
leading a noble life. For instance, they can increase one’s charisma, 
enhance one’s public image, and thereby prepare one to perform noble acts 
(NE 1099a31-b6) . It requires (philosophical) reflection to give these 108
specific ends their proper places. The agent will then have the right 
priorities; he will not, for instance, overvalue the importance of good birth 
over virtuous character. These careful analyses of the relative evaluative 
importance of different goods, one might object, cannot be the result of 
merely the exercise of the non-rational soul. The rational soul must have 
contributed to fix the ends - more precisely, to fix the proper place of 
specific ends within the hierarchy of values.

   In light of these doubts, advocates of the Socratic conception might try to 
turn the table on his opponents. They may insist that although educating 
the non-rational part of the soul is necessary, what EE 1214b7-11 describes 
as “the power to live according to his own choice” is still indispensable, and 
attaining the comprehensive hierarchical conception of human values is of 
much practical significance. The role of the virtues of character, accordingly, 
is really just to listen and obey “as the logos commands” (NE 1102b26-32; 
1119b13–18; 1125b34–35).

 Interpretation of the passage found in Kraut (1989, 254-5). 108
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   By contrast, one might respond, on Moss’ behalf, that the comprehensive 
(all-encompassing) conception of human values is not really necessary. For 
having a good upbringing already gives you the right priorities: one’s 
character is not expressed only in one’s actions but also in one’s process of 
reasoning (see section 1.1.3): some lines will not be crossed if one is a 
virtuous person, some options do not even cross the virtuous person’s 
mind, and so on . Further, in deciding what to do, we consider the 109
particularities case-by-case rather than appealing to a comprehensive 
conception of human values . One may not even have a coherent picture 110
about how these particular elements fit together; yet one can still make a 
wise-enough choice. At times, appealing to rules of thumb sufficed .
111
   So it seems we are in a stalemate. Followers of Moss may insist that it is 
the virtues of character, properly instilled, that give our deliberation and the 
general conception the required raison d’être. Moss’ account tries to 
accommodate the general conceptions as part of “things toward ends”; and 
the comprehensive conception of human values is not even necessary for 
wise decisions. The Socratic conception, on the other hand, may argue that 
all that one’s upbringing can do is to prepare one for acquiring wisdom. 
Wisdom itself, marked by having the comprehensive conception of human 
values, cannot be given through the excellence of the non-rational part of 
the soul.

 Broadie (1991, 245). 109
 Note that these considerations of particularities are typically made available to the 110
ordinary mature agents through sufficient experiences (to the right kind of situations), 
not intellectual reflections. 
 Nussbaum (1992, 73). 111
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  In what remains of the present chapter I will bring in what I found in 
Chapter 2 about the importance of ethical community and prove that it can 
help adjudicate the stalemate between the Socratic conception and Moss’ 
account. My strategy is fairly straightforward: I will elaborate in greater 
detail the way how the non-rational soul shapes one’s ends/values. I believe 
this will show that the above-mentioned doubts are really ungrounded and 




4.2.1 Friendship and eudaimonia  
  First, recall, I argued that the egalitarian fellow feeling or “solidarity” 
among the participants (parents to children, siblings, non-familial comrades, 
etc.) is at the heart of Aristotelian conception of ethical community, and this 
is supposed to be distinguished from the paternalistic Platonic conception. 
The theory of friendship plays some important role. I will now articulate 
some general connection between friendship and one’s goals. 

   Let’s first look at eudaimonia, the highest human good or the ultimate 
goal. In NE IV. 9 Aristotle discussed “whether the happy man will need 
friends or not” (1169b3). For the happy man (i.e. the man living a flourishing 
life) is (by default) self-sufficient, and thus will not need a “friend” to bestow 
benefits on him. 
112
 Aristotle first replied that since it is characteristic of a virtuous person to confer 112
benefits (than to receive) and since it is nobler to confer them on friends (rather than 
on strangers), one needs friends to express one’s virtues (1169b3-15). This response, 
it seems to me, is a bit strained. 
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  One of Aristotle’s arguments involves the thesis “human being is a political 
being” (b18). Human beings live a social life, and among all kinds of people, 
it is much more pleasant to live with friends than with strangers (b19-21). 
We have came upon this notion several times before: for Aristotle, the need 
of friendship is grounded in human nature.

  Then there is an argument about how happiness is a sort of activity and 
how friendship can contribute to this activity. It seems to be intertwined 
with a long and difficult passage several lines below. There is much to 
discuss in this argument but I will have to be brief. The ideas seem to be the 
following. One’s friend is, according to Aristotle, “another self”. Since the 
virtuous man enjoys his life, and since his friend is similar to him, so the 
friend also enjoy his own life. But the virtuous man enjoys fine and pleasant 
things, so he enjoys having such a friend and spending his life with the 
friend - that is, his company (1170b14-6). So friendship is one of the 
essential components of one’s eudaimonia. This is what we should expect 
given what we have said about educating children. In both contexts, 
friendship is one of the essential components. This seems to be good 
news, for it paves the way for claiming that the education of children also 
prepares them to have a eudaimonistic life. Indeed, “it is presumably 
strange too to make a blessed person live a solitary life” (1169b16). What’s 
more, this also gives us a rough answer to the first doubt noted above, 
namely, that one needs the intellect to identify what kind of life one should 
choose (so the intellect is responsible for determining the ends after all). For 
to say that childhood education prepares the child to have a flourishing life 
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invites the idea that what kind of life one will choose (will consider as 
flourishing) is to a considerable extent fixed by one’s upbringing. 

  Finally, to come back to the point about how human nature demands 
companions, Aristotle noted that “for a solitary person life is difficult, since 
it is not easy for him, when all by himself, to be continuously in activity, 
whereas together with others and in relation to others it is 
easier” (1170a4-6). As Cooper interpreted, simply as a matter of our 
psychological make-up, humans cannot automatically and continuously 
engage in any activities with the same degree of passion merely because of 
what the activities are like . Even for activities that one enjoys very much 113
doing - say, playing music - one’s feelings can be paralysed by repetition. 
But with the company of one’s true friends, even repetition can be a source 
of enjoyment (“ah, I feel the same, too”; 1170a4-12). In general, friendship 
contributes to eudaimonia by facilitating the sense of satisfaction the 
participants get in joining group activities . 
114
4.2.2 How one learns about values through friendships  
   So I have explained some general relations between friendship and the 
ultimate goal, eudaimonia. I now proceed to more specific goals. 

 Cooper (1980, 331). 113
 At times Aristotle spoke as if having a true friend is what allows us to be aware of 114
our own happiness (1170b1-14). For sometimes we can be quite ignorant as to how 
lucky or blessed we are, but if the same is happening to someone very similar to us 
(friend is “another self”), we are more likely to appreciate the pleasant nature of the 
event  (1169b34-5). After all, we would be “as impoverished as other animals”, if, 
although exhibiting wondrous ingenuity and rich personalities, we are not able to love 
and celebrate these fascinating phenomena through our own eyes (as the wondrous 
nature of animals is appreciated only by the human observer) (Broadie & Rowe (2002, 
63).
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  Developing friendship with others may just help one to better understand 
different values. This is particularly true in the case of “character-friendship” 
- friendship founded on character. As is well-known, Aristotle distinguished 
three kinds of friendship, the pleasure-friendship, the benefits-friendship, 
and the character-friendship. All three kinds share some genuine features of 
friendship: they are bound by mutually acknowledged reciprocal good will 
that is grounded on the qualities for which the participants are loved in the 
first place (NE VIII. 4). For pleasure-friendship, such quality is pleasure, for 
benefits-friendship, it is benefits, for character-friendship, character. The 
character-friendship is the most complete and perfect kind of friendship, 
because it is also pleasurable and beneficial for the participants, while the 
two other kinds of friendship are not inclusive in similar ways. 

  Now, as we have seen in section 1.1.4, one’s character informs one’s 
evaluation of specific ends and thus expresses one’s conception of the 
good. In Moss’ account, this amounts to saying that the general evaluative 
appearances one has as to what is worth-pursuing express one’s character. 
It follows that character-friendship encapsulates one’s grasp of the friend’s 
conception of the good or his perception of what is valuable, for the 
friendship is grounded on their respective characters. This captures the 
intuitive sense of intimacy true friendship should exemplify . Friends will 115
find their attitudes and maybe even emotions naturally “in sync”.

  So when friends bound by character hang out (“living together and sharing 
in talk and thought”), communication about their respective fundamental 
 Cooper (1980, 330). 115
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ends blossoms and there will be mutual understanding (NE 1170b10-13). 
They will express their views on, say, politics, how they spend their leisure, 
how they feel about others, their dreams, and so on. This communication is 
itself pleasurable and is one of the constituents of eudaimonia. But 
communicating one’s conception of goodness inevitably involves 
articulating and exchanging some general notions concerning the 
constituents of goodness - more precisely, general notions as they are 
understood by this particular individual. So in the case of character-
friendship, general understanding of the constituents of goodness and 
perception of the particular exemplifications of such goodness are nicely 
united. In this way, developing character-friendship with others enhances 
one’s ethical sense. (Further, the experience of “having friends” certainly 
fosters ethical qualities such as love and trust, see below). 

   All these square fairly well with Moss’ account. For one thing, arguably, 
the interaction with different characters will broaden one’s basis of 
induction, and therefore one’s evaluative appearances. For another, she 
argued that beliefs are assent to appearances . That is, despite being 116
more conceptualised, the contents of beliefs are determined by one’s 
perception and phantasia. All that rational cognition does is to articulate 
explicitly what is implicitly understood in one’s non-rational cognition. This 
will occur when one tries to understand the different particularised 
conceptions of goodness. As she said, she can grant this to the 
Intellectualists without compromising her own position, since 
 See section 3.3.1, n.83.116
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conceptualising implicit contents does not entail having insights into the 
highest human good (the function of nous according to the Socratic 
conception). 

4.2.3 How emotions inform our specific goals 
    In this connection it is natural to recall Aristotle’s Rhetoric. The key to an 
Aristotelian theory of emotion and rhetoric is the idea of non-rational 
cognition, i.e. evaluative perceptions and phantasia. Moss’ certainly puts 
such cognition right at the centre of her theory of practical induction and 
virtues.  
117
  Mostly because of the cognitive nature of emotions, these emotional 
states are susceptible to rhetorical exhortation. As is well-known, the 
Rhetoric is devoted precisely to such a project. By familiarising oneself with 
the different beliefs, dispositions, objects, circumstances and behaviours 
typically associated with different emotions, and by describing the scenario 
as vividly as possible,  the orator hopes to master the art of directing 118
(manipulating) the audiences’ hearts.

   Now we are ready to give a more substantive reply to the first objection 
noted above: that we need the practical intellect to identify the goal of 
action. Since emotions are cognitive, and since emotions are pluralistic and 
context-sensitive in the sense that naturally one will experience different 
emotions for different occasions, it is plausible to suggest that emotions 
can help reveal the salient features of the situation to which the emotions 
 This at least amounts to the position now called the cognitivist account of emotion: 117
that emotions involve evaluations. Moss (2012, 76). 
 Rhet. 1386a29-b7.118
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are answerable. Consequently, to better understand emotions in general 
and one’s own specific emotions in a particular context will help calibrate 
one’s appreciation of the salient features of the situation. As a result, one 
can approach the issues and decide what to do by emotionally engaging 
with the situation, case by case. For instance, one deliberates by thinking of 
whether a course of action will make one proud or make one shameful. This 
depends to a considerable extent on the list of cases one associates with 
“proud” and “shame” respectively. This practical intellect may be 
responsible for articulating the implicit contents of emotions (and the salient 
features of the situation the emotions are addressing), but it does not 
determine the contents themselves. 

4.3 Intellectual skills 
   So I have argued that deliberation is not of ends. But this does not mean 
that the practical intellect does not have any substantive contributions to 
practical deliberation. In fact, in line with what I have said in section 4.1.1, 
where general laws (i.e. not just immediate means) can also be included in 
the “things toward ends”, in this section I will explain how the “intellectual 
skills” Aristotle discussed (in NE VI. 10 and 11) contribute to practical 
reasoning. 

  The point is that to acquire these skills is far from developing a 
comprehensive conception of human value. Firstly, one will need 
discernment or consideration (gnome): an ability to give “correct judgement 
of what is reasonable/equitable/decent (epieikes)” (1143a20). What is 
equitable is explained in terms of giving the right verdict concerning 
 of 125 147
exceptional cases - cases where universal laws failed to apply. Sometimes 
this involves having an insight into possible non-stereotypical ways to fulfil 
the demand of certain virtues. 
  Then, Aristotle believed that someone who has discernment also has the 
ability to sympathise with others’ point of view (sungnome; 1143a28-31). 
Consequently, doing what is equitable also involves an ability to exchange 
different parties’ different perspectives on the same subject. The agent 
needs to think beyond his own horizon, and try to get “in sync with” others’ 
emotions. Hursthouse (2006) especially emphasises the importance of 
“comprehension” (sunesis) in this respect , which involves the ability to 119
judge “in order to discriminate about the things wisdom deals with, when 
someone else is speaking” (1143a11–16). But Aristotle’s remarks are very 
brief, and what follows is my own elaboration. Since our understanding of 
situations are largely dependent on others reports and accounts, the wise 
man will have to be able to do the following. a) To judge about others’ 
words, which might include discriminating between: reliable and unreliable 
source of information, semantic and pragmatic expressions, sincere but 
mistaken accounts and deceiving but useful accounts, and so on. 
Comprehension allows the wise to avoid one-sidedness as much as 
possible, in the sense that it enables him to make good use of the 
information and accounts gathered, so that he can piece together a bigger 
picture of the situation. b) To judge with others’ considered views, as they 
are equally intelligent. In cases where one needs to address the preferences 
 Hursthouse (2006, 293-5). 119
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of agents, comprehension allows the wise person to negotiate and mediate 
better. In this way he can achieve the best solution where most of the 
participants’ preferences can be accommodated. 

  This echoes the analogy between the interpretation of situation and 
geometrical reasoning we noted in section 3.3. One tries to analyse the 
situation based on what one already knows, one shifts between different 
perspectives until finally a new and more reasonable interpretation comes 
up. Different perspectives are like different hypotheses, and one needs to 
find a solution that can withstand the tests of most (if not all) reasonable 
hypotheses (in agreement with most perspectives). This fits what Aristotle 
said about the concerns of comprehension: one needs to exercise 
comprehension only when one puzzles about what to do (1143a5). 

  So here is the final reply to the objection that says we need the 
comprehensive conception of human value to determine the ends. One 
certainly needs the intellectual skills to analyse information, others’ 
speeches, preferences and perspectives, and to come up with a bigger 
picture of the situation. Will this lead to us to a comprehensive conception 
of human value? But these skills are directed at the situation, not a general 
conception. It can tell you, for instance, when your shy friend neither 
accepts nor rejects an invitation, he means not to come, but just doesn’t 
know how to refuse. But it cannot tell you that, for instance, friendship is an 
essential part of eudaimonia. That, I have argued, is instilled in the agent as 
part of the education of the virtues of character (viz. about what is worth 
pursuing).
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4.4 The ethical community  
4.4.1 Emotions and the ethical community  
  Now, note that the ethical community plays a crucial role in shaping, 
brewing, communicating and developing the emotions. The effect of a 
communal background is most explicit when Aristotle remarked that people 
feel shame when (they imagine they are) being observed by others (already 
quoted before):

Cydias said to the people in the debate about the allotment of land 
in Samos; for he thought the Athenians should suppose the Greeks 
standing around them in a circle, actually seeing and not only later 
hearing about what they might vote. (1384b32-35, emphasise mine)

   Relatedly, there is a very close relation between “shame” and “honour” on 
the one hand and “ethical membership” on the other, at least as Aristotle 
conceived of it. This is most evident in the following passage:

people before whom we feel shame are those whose opinion of us 
matters to us. Such persons are: those who admire us, those whom 
we admire, those by whom we wish to be admired, those with whom 
we are competing, and those whose opinion of us we respect (Rhet. 
ii 6.1384a22–27).  
  Further, the ethical community is crucial not just for giving ethical 
assessments. In fact, it is reasonable to suggest that the emotions are 
embedded in the interpersonal relationships one shares with other 
members. For instance, Aristotle noted that one feels pity “in general 
whenever one is so disposed as to remember such things happening to 
himself or to one of his loved ones, or to expect such things to occur to him 
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or to one of his loved ones.” (1386a1-3). This is expected given what we 
have said about immersing into an ethical community. In fact, Aristotle once 
characterised passion, the focal point of virtue education, as what gives 
birth to friendship in the first place: “passion is the quality of the soul which 
begets friendship and enables us to love; notably the spirit within us is more 
stirred against our friends and acquaintances than against those who are 
unknown to us, when we think that we are despised by them” (Rhet. 
1328a1-5). This reaffirms the idea that philia is indispensable for (early) 
moral education. 

   The echoes a claim I made at the end of ch.2: the human develops virtues 
(and vices) in forming communities. Virtues and vices are impossible 
without the community. Further, the ethical importance of having good 
friend can be explained by this: they provide the favourable conditions for 
the expression of quasi-virtues (section 2.2.3).

4.4.2 Intellectual skills and the ethical community  
  There are also unmistakable traces of the presence of the ethical 
community in one’s exercise of the intellectual skills. Recall two points 
earlier. First, I suggested that developing character-friendship is a way to 
develop one’s ethical sense because communicating and exchanging 
viewpoints with friends is a way to learn different particularised conceptions 
of goodness - conceptions of goodness as they are exemplified by one’s 
friend’s character. Second, I noted that the exercise of comprehension 
involves sympathising with others’ perspectives. These two points 
combined suggest that the use of comprehension can be directed at one’s 
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character: what we would say “to read” others’ character (and 
personalities).

  Aristotle noted that “this is where the name “comprehension”—in the 
sense of what makes people have good comprehension (eunsunetoi)—
came from, namely, the comprehension involved in learning. (1143a15-18).” 
As such, comprehension is located at an interesting point somewhere 
between theoretical and practical wisdom. For on the one hand, it involves 
cognitive attitudes such as beliefs, and is discerning rather than prescriptive 
(1143a6-9). But on the other, it concerns things in the practical realm: what 
people say about what is acting finely (kalos) (a14). So comprehension is 
about discerning what people say about fine actions. Presumably, what one 
regards as fine tells something about one’s character (at least one’s 
aspiration). Further, as we have seen, comprehension is also about those 
situations where one is puzzled about what to do. Arguably, this tells 
something about one’s character, too: as conventional wisdom tells us, 
one’s decisions and actions in morally ambiguous or otherwise difficult 
situations tell a lot about one’s character. To read one’s character, then, 
involves seeing things from their perspectives: on what difficulties they face, 
the costs and the compromises, and so on. 

   So, the ethical community is relevant for a theory of practical deliberation, 
in the sense that one needs to sympathise with other members of the 
community. But ethical community provides the framework for deliberation 
in a further sense: there can be collective reasoning. This should not be so 
surprising. If eudaimonia, as I have explained, is itself constituted by sharing 
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lives and cooperating with others (NE 1097b8-14), then one may well rely 
on others for their life experiences and expertise when deliberating about 
what to do. In fact, this is a commonplace in managing a household, which 
is part of what practical wisdom is concerned with (1142a29-33). Relatedly, 
in NE III. 3, Aristotle argued that we deliberate only about those things that 
are possible for us to achieve, and: “by ‘possible things’ I mean things that 
might be brought about by our own efforts; and these in a sense include 
things that can be brought about by the efforts of our friends, since the 
moving principle is in ourselves (1112b27-28)”. So, as long as the moving 
principle is originated in the group as a whole, different individuals (though 
numerically distinct) can be seen as participating the same process of 
collective deliberation . 
120
  We are very far from the comprehensive and hierarchical conception of 
human values. Below is also my elaboration, but I think it is fairly 
“Aristotelian”. Excellent deliberation may look like this. Suppose what you 
think you need to do will put you in a dangerous position. You reasonably 
believe that the action is morally required. But you do not know if you are 
the most suitable person to do that, nor if you are the only one who has the 
chance. So there will be room for thinking, reasonably, “It’s not now or 
never, it will be alright even if I don’t do it now”.  Meanwhile, you have 121
friends and families caring for you, urging you not to take that risk. So, 
courage may push you into one direction, and the care you have in return to 
 Sherman (1989, 54).120
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the love of your friends and family may push you into another. Here is the 
deliberation. You start to think of a courageous figure you are familiar with, 
and imagine what he will do. It could be someone you know in your daily 
life, or a historical figure, maybe even a fictional figure. You have concrete 
understanding of his specific attitudes, dispositions, preferences, and so 
on. At the same time, you also think of what your friends and families would 
say if you do choose to stand out. It will be like envisaging the conversation 
between these two parties. 

  Theorising deliberation in terms of conversation has several theoretical 
advantages. Firstly, as I take it this is fairly common. Few (if any) people 
really deliberate by first settling on a well-defended choice of end (through 
Socratic inductive reasoning), then working out the means to this chosen 
end. Instead, people often begins by an end particularised to a certain 
degree and familiarised with a certain “face” (the image/figure/model 
associated). It is such an end that we can relate to and therefore are 
interested in pursuing in the first place. Second, interpretation of the 
situation is perspective-dependent. What one sees as threat, another sees 
as challenge; what one sees as chaos, another sees as opportunity. If I am 
deliberating whether to do that action in the above-mentioned scenario, 
what I see as the least dangerous alternative could be, in my family’s eyes, 
an indication of my stubbornness, since I decided to stand out anyway, 
despite their disagreement. In ordinary conversation, people naturally 
describe the situation in the way they see it, as it presents to them given 
their perspectives. So theorising the deliberative process in terms of 
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conversation captures the perspective-dependency when one is shifting 
between different interpretations. Finally, utterances often come with 
emotional power. Should I feel exhausted and start to consider whether to 
give up, particular rhetoric or expressions may keep me fighting (e.g. “think 
of those who sacrificed for this. Don’t let them down”). Theorising 
deliberation in terms of conversation captures how different proposals one 
deliberates about have emotional, therefore motivational, power. 

4.5 Egalitarian ethical community (solidarity revisited) 
   In section 2.3.4 I wrote “to be able to go beyond the conventional social 
roles and look for a higher level of equality (thus of solidarity) is itself a 
crucial step in the course of virtue development”. And I promised to 
elaborate on some the themes noted there. Now we are ready to do so. 
This will also help illustrate once again Moss’ account given what I have 
said about the role of ethical community (and philia) in influencing one’s 
emotions and practical deliberation. 

    I wrote that blending into non-familial communities is itself a way to learn 
about the purposes, thus the values, of different human activities. We 
should now be more familiar with the key terminologies at least. In general, 
we now have a theory, built on Moss’ account, that tells us how “human 
activities”, “the pursuit of value”, and “ethical community” relate to each 
other. We explore human values through participating purposeful human 
activities with other members of the community. Now, the crucial question 
is: what binds us as equal members of a non-conventional community?
Consider this passage:
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(a) But friendship seems to consist more in loving than in being 
loved. An indication of this is that it is in loving that mothers take 
enjoyment. For mothers sometimes give away their own children to 
be reared by others, and though they love them (since they know 
who they are), they do not look for reciprocal love (if love in both 
directions is impossible). Instead it seems enough for them to see 
that their children are doing well, and they themselves love their 
children even if these render up none of the things appropriate to a 
mother because of their ignorance of who she is. 

(b) Since friendship consists more in loving, however, and those who 
love their friends are praised, loving seems to be the virtue 
characteristic of friends, so that (c) it is those in whom love comes 
about in accord with worth who are steadfast friends and have a 
steadfast friendship. It is in this way that even unequals will best be 
friends, since in this way they will be equalized. (NE 1159a27-37, 
trans. Reeve ).
122
  The reference to giving away the children in (a) may sound surprising, 
given, as we have seen, what Aristotle said about the practical difficulties of 
fully separating newborn babies from their biological parents.  But clearly 123
it is meant to illustrate a more general point: the kind of love that asks for no 
return (for there is no opportunity to return in that scenario) at all. Those 
mothers who send their children away to be reared by others (for practical 
reasons, the passage implies) cannot expect the children to pay back their 
love because the children simply do not know who their biological mother 
 Reeve (2014, 146). 122
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are. The love of the mothers consists primarily in seeing “that their children 
are doing well, and they themselves love their children” .
124
    I think Aristotle was making a general point about the expressions of love 
as it is characteristic of friends: that it is more about to give (loving) than to 
receive (being loved). This is (b). The reference to mothers is meant to 
illustrate how this is possible even in the extreme situation (with no 
possibility of returning love at all). To receive love from the beloved is not 
part of the reason why each party in the friendship gives his or her love in 
the first place. From the subjective point of view, this shares similarity with 
the kind of nonreciprocal and wholehearted concerns the mothers have for 
their estranged children. The difference is just that, given a mutual bond, 
character-friends do get the return of love. Building on this thought, 
Aristotle in (c) proceeded to suggest that in unwavering and permanent 
friendship, the friends must be worthy of such love. Then he drew the 
conclusion that is most interesting for our purpose: that the unequals can 
be equalised. 

   So unequals can be equalised when: a) each party of the relationship 
focuses on giving rather than receiving; and b) each party is worthy of the 
love given by the other party (or parties). 

  What follows is my elaboration. First, note that at least for character-
friends between well-brought up agents, friends are counting on each other 
to keep themselves virtuous. As Aristotle continued: “For it is characteristic 
 Note that the passage does not seem to imply that there is anything (not anything 124
concrete anyway) the mothers can do for the children. At best, it may include 
choosing a better foster family; but obviously this is not guaranteed. 
 of 135 147
of good people neither to commit errors themselves nor to allow their 
friends to do so” (1159b5-6). Conversely, it is by being accountable to each 
other that they show themselves to be worthy of the love, and thus of a 
steadfast friendship. So other than mutual understanding, the intimacy 
between friends is also expressed in the degree of trust one has for another. 
And this is a kind of trust with moral ramification: one’s friend will not ask 
oneself to do dishonourable things, for otherwise one will not be worthy of 
love. 

   Second, as I have said, sympathetic understanding requires one to have 
certain respect towards others’ decisions. If so, then, the intimacy 
expressed in mutual understanding and mutual trust also facilitates mutual 
respect, for naturally it is easier for one to respect those one understands 
and trusts. 

   But one may observe that “respect” as an attitude sometimes requires not 
interfering with others’ decisions (whenever appropriate). This raises the 
question: how is one’s respect for one’s friends expressed, if respect 
requires noninterference? How is a friend different from, say, a complete 
stranger (since both of them did nothing to interfere with one’s choice)?

  I suggest that there is a question of appropriate attitude. This is a question 
not about action (thus no possibility of interference), but about 
perspectives.

   This brings us back to the nature of solidity. For there can be perspective 
that one adopts to show one’s solidarity with one’s friend, when there is not 
much to be done. One can show one’s wholehearted support of one’s friend 
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by adopting the perspective that allows one to feel as if one is sharing 
“one” life with one’s friend. While this may not lead to any immediate and 
relevant action, it certainly fosters the steadfastness of the friendship. The 
upshot is that the intimacy of character-friendship is not just expressed in 
mutual understanding, mutual trust, mutual respect, but also mutual 
solidarity. 

  What I have said hitherto in relation to NE 1159a27-37 illustrates quite 
elaborately the spirit of egalitarian ethical communities, and therefore how 
unequals can be equalised. Love that does not ask for anything in return 
shows one’s passions, which helps break the external barriers that unequal 
social status may bring. Mutual trust shows possibility of cooperation, 
which facilitates fellow-feeling. Noninterference shows room for 
disagreements (with respect to decisions), which fosters diversity. Mutual 
solidarity shows unity, which helps sustain the community. 

  One question remains: how exactly do we identify the non-conventional 
egalitarian ethical community? Given we have elaborated on the qualities 
essential for an egalitarian ethical community, I think the answer is that it 
depends on the context. It can be formed via strategic (though not only 
strategic) concerns, or via cooperation between different social groups. The 
point is that they are crucial for virtue development as long as they instil the 
ethical qualities I outlined: love, mutual understanding, etc.

   Given that the ethical community constitutes a larger part of the cultural 
context the agent is supposed to immerse himself in (see the end of ch.2), 
the Aristotelian account dictates that this community - the egalitarian 
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community - is the one within which habituation-immersion takes place. To 
go through mousike education, for instance, is to learn about love, respect, 
trust, understanding and solidarity with the fictional characters (and, of 
course, eventually with the real-life counterparts). 

  Basically, I add two further elements to Moss’ account: the ethical 
community (friendship) and intellectual skills. I am inclined to say my 
conclusion is still within her basic contention. For one, if habituation really is 
immersion into certain cultural context and community, and if the ethical 
community really does have a role to play in shaping one’s passions or 
emotions, then it is reasonable to say we form the general appearances as 
to what is worth-pursuing (this is how Moss characterises our endorsement 
of ends) through living as a member of an ethical community. For another, 
given a very wide notion of “things toward ends” (that can include items 
such as general policies), and despite substantive contributions from the 
exercise of intellectual skills, the practical intellect is responsible only for 
figuring out possible implementations of given ends. Reasoning does not 
establish ends after all. 

Recap 
  This chapter explores an Aristotelian theory of practical deliberation and 
how the ethical community contributes to this deliberation. I began by 
discussing how reasoning does not establish ends, which amounts to an 
argument against the Anti-Humean about Aristotle’s theory of practical 
reason. Then I proceeded to explain how one learns about values through 
friendships: in character-friendships, the friend’s character is a 
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particularised version of his conception of goodness, in gaining mutual 
understanding with friends, one thereby learns about the corresponding 
conception (of goodness). With reference to the Rhetoric, I also explained 
how emotion informs our specific goals. Then I articulated the elements 
related to ethical community implicit in Aristotle’s theory of emotions and 
his discussion of intellectual skills. I emphasised that what he called 
“comprehension” (sunesis) requires sympathetic understanding, and this 
echoes my discussion of friendship. Building on the idea that it is through 
developing friendships that one learns about values, I then suggested 
“practical deliberation” should be theorised as a kind of conversation. 
Finally, I return to the topic of solidarity and egalitarian ethical community 
again, in the hope that this will deepen our understanding of the ethical 
qualities involved in participating in the practices of an egalitarian ethical 
community (which I believe is Aristotle’s preferred version of community). I 
discover that these qualities are: mutual love, mutual understanding, mutual 
trust, mutual respect, and mutual solidarity.

 of 139 147
Final Conclusion  
   In the General Introduction and several places I talked of how there are 
basically two camps in theorising “virtues” - the intellectualised and the 
non-intellectualised - and each bring with it its own “philosophical 
package”. Now we should have a better idea what this means. At the end of 
Chapter 3, I indicated how the critical practice model (in Chapter 1) and the 
Socratic conception of practical induction can enrich each other: the 
specification of the ideal model should be informed by one’s latest 
understanding of the essence of the relevant virtue and/or eudaimonia. 
Similarly, the “habituation as immersion” thesis (in Chapter 1) and Moss’ 
account of practical induction belong to the same package, as Moss’ 
account of how one generalises from particular evaluative perceptions to 
form evaluative appearances can help explain the process of immersion. 
This is where, as I have argued, the boundary is most clear. 

   But other parts allow for the same demarcation, too. What I dubbed the 
epistemic reading of the effect of habituation, though rejected early on, 
belongs to the intellectualised camp, as I have briefly noted near the end of 
section 1.2.1. According to this reading, habituation gives us a vantage 
point to grasp firmly the nature of eudaimonia. This looks like something the 
Socratic conception of practical induction would agree to and welcome; 
and one’s understanding of the nature of eudaimonia can then serve as the 
ground for articulating the ideal model. As the dialectic between the two 
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camps moves on, what I have said about quasi-virtues and the ethical value 
of the nuclear family (Chapter 2) also find their places. Quasi-virtues are 
non-intellectual starting-points of virtue eduction (section 1.3) and as such 
the category serves to explain how (human) nature and habits (as 
immersion) work together (section 2.2.4). So “quasi-virtues” enrich the non-
intellectualised account of virtue education. Together with the idea that the 
nuclear family constitutes a crucial component of the context of 
habituation-immersion, I concluded at the end of Chapter 2 that virtues and 
vices are impossible without the community and habituation-immersion 
expresses the nature of human beings as political (social) animal. As 
another nuance of the idea that nature and habits work together, this 
conclusion further elaborates the non-intellectualist account of virtue 
acquisition. 

    Finally, the opposition between the two camps also finds its expression in 
the theory of practical deliberation. The intellectualised account says we 
need a comprehensive conception of human value to deliberate excellently, 
and the non-intellectualised account that I argued for says it is one’s proper 
upbringing, emotions, and connection with the ethical community that 
shape one’s evaluation of ends. Then, theorising deliberation as 
conversation and emphasising sympathetic understanding are some ways 
how the non-intellectualised account can do justice to the positive and 
robust contributions the practical intellect can have in practical deliberation. 
They complete the non-intellectualised camp for they show how an non-
intellectualised account can be true not just of early virtue education (of the 
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child, of the passions) but also of wise (excellent) deliberation. The 
emphases on solidarity, love, mutual trust and mutual understanding 
epitomise how the non-intellectualised camp can give us a convincing 
ethical picture.

  So, given all my arguments, I conclude that, according this Aristotelian 
account, a rather non-intellectualised account is closer to the truth. Though, 
as I said in the General Introduction, my aim is to give a “philosophical 
reconstruction” of Aristotle; I have no space to discuss other virtue theories 
in contemporary philosophy. But I hope what I have said at least makes this 
“Aristotelian” account a respectable candidate worthy of serious 
consideration. 
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The translation of Aristotle’s texts are from:

Broadie, S., and C. Rowe. (2002). Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics; 
   Translation, Introduction, and Commentary. New York: Oxford University 
   Press.
Irwin, T.H. (1999). Nicomachean Ethics. 2nd ed. Hackett Publishing Co, Inc. 
J.Barnes (ed.), (1985). The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford  
   Translation.Princeton University Press.

Reeve, C.D.C (2014). Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics Translated With 
   Introduction and Notes. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 
Abbreviation: 
APo.     Posterior Analytics 

DA.       De Anima

EE.        Eudemian Ethics

HA.       History of Animals 

MA.      Movement of Animals

Mem.    On Memory

Meta.    Metaphysics

NE.       Nicomachean Ethics

Ph.        Physics

Poet.     Poetics 

Pol.       Politics

Rhet.     Rhetoric 

Top.      Topics 
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